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Abstract 
This paper seeks to make sense ofHong Kong's peculiar upgrade trajectory over the 
past two decades by a social-organizational approach with special reference to the 
electronics industry. The puzzle: the industry never took advantage ofits earlier lead 
to catch up with the regional race by moving towards high value-added activities, 
only to excel in contract manufacturing for low-profit, large-volume items. My 
contention: there persists an organizational form whose contribution to its early 
success in international subcontracting also constitutes its later failure in industrial 
upgrading. Interestingly enough, its stagnation in the subcontractor role is full of 
dynamics at both the field and firm levels. With the electronics field connected to the 
international subcontracting network from the outset, those who secure close contact 
with overseas buyers are best posited to set up an industrial firm. With the vast 
majority of industrial entrepreneurs arising within this subcontracting network, the 
industrial field saw the rapid rise of an organizational form that is set to excel in the 
subcontractor role at the expense of other tasks. As it unfolds, collective 
preoccupation with international subcontracting turns into collective inaction in 
industrial upgrading. But Hong Kong could have significantly upgraded its industrial 
base by linking with other networks of global division of labor had there emerged 
alternative organizational forms, given the abundant business opportunities over the 
past decade. However, the proximate institutional context has always been less 
supportive to these alternative organizational forms, depriving the electronics industry 
of a critical mass that could have made a difference in its upgrade performance. In 
sum, Hong Kong's peculiar path to industrial upgrading is rather a result of social 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SOCIALIZING ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
THE PUZZLE: WHY FRONTRUNNER FINISHES LAST 
The rapid rise ofEast Asia has lured so many scholars that post-war industrialization 
in the so-called "four little dragons" ~ Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan ~ has been a hot topic in development studies for more than two decades. But 
despite their apparent similarity in early industrialization, the 1980s saw such a sharp 
diversity among their paths to economic restructuring that Hong Kong turns out to be 
an underachiever in industrial upgrading. Should we take their contrasting upgrade 
performances into serious consideration, an exceptional case like Hong Kong 
deserves much research attention. This thesis therefore seeks to make sense ofHong 
Kong's peculiar upgrade trajectory by a social-organizational approach with special 
reference to the electronics industry. 
East Asian Model Untangled 
Earlier researches on the phenomenal economic growth of East Asia generated a 
complex literature, in which four major streams can be identified: free-market thesis, 
state-centered approach, neo-modernization theory and global perspective (Chiu et al. 
1997: Chapter 1). Taking the region as an unit of analysis, adherents of the above 
strands each developed an "East Asian Model" by looking for the "crucial similarity" 
among the four MEs through different lens. First of all, free-market advocates like 
Balassa (1988) and Milton and Rose Friedman (1980) highlight the well-functioning 
market mechanism where price signals allocate resources efficiently and effectively. 
Yet this view is challenged by statists including Johnson (1987), Amsden (1985) and 
Wade (1988) who stress that the state in these economies each plays a much more 
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active and extensive role in the socio-economic transformation than free-market 
advocates assume. Beyond the market-versus-state debate are neo-modernization 
theorists, who embrace cultural categories like Confucian heritage (MacFarquhar 
1980) and family entrepreneurialism (Wong 1988). Meanwhile, the global 
perspective just takes the "Asian Miracle" as another restructuring of the international 
political economy in the Post-War era (Dicken 1992; Henderson 1989). 
Even though the literature made a great contribution to the account ofEast Asian 
development, its focus on the regional level obscures diversity among economies. 
The market-versus-state debate is illustrative enough, with free-market advocates like 
Milton and Rose Friedman (ibid.) selectively highlighting the case of Hong Kong 
whereas statists like Johnson (ibid.) tend to ignore this former British colony. Not 
surprisingly, doubts remain as to whether there is one development model in East Asia 
(see, for examples, Dowling 1994; Kuznets 1994 and Perkins 1994). 
Such diversity becomes more apparent as we shift the focus from 
industrialization to industrial upgrading. As an example, UNCTAD (1996) compares 
the export pattern of Asian MEs over the 1963-90 period, and singles out Hong Kong 
for its loss of market share in almost half of the highly dynamic products in which it 
had earlier built a strong market presence. Echoing this point. Chow and Kellman 
(1993) note that while all the four NIEs have successfully upgraded their exports from 
labor-intensive and resource-based products to more technology-intensive ones 
through the mid-60s to early 90s, Hong Kong had the least structural transformation 
of commodity composition of exports over the period. With the other three NIEs 
having dramatically upgraded their local industrial bases in one way or another (Chiu 
1994), it is puzzling that Hong Kong has stuck with labor-intensive manufacturing for 
over three decades (Chiu et al. 1997). 
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Before we move on to the next section to take a closer look at their contrasting 
upgrade performances with reference to the electronics industry, I must first point out 
that "industrial upgrading" takes a rather broad definition in this paper. This key 
concept comprises three dimensions: 1) product upgrade means moving towards 
high-value added products without altering the technology content, as for examples, 
by cosmetics design, brand development and quality enhancement; 2) process 
innovation refers to upgrading the production process of existing products by 
increasing automation, using a new quality control system and redesigning the 
production system, to name but three; and 3) technology catch-up means approaching 
the world's technology frontier by acquiring a state-of-the-art technology, 
commercializing an emerging technology and so on. Taking industrial upgrading as a 
continuous process, this paper assesses how much upgrade a locality has achieved in 
which aspect instead of whether upgrade is achieved. 
Electronics Industry as a Crucial Case 
This paper follows the convention in the field to define the electronics industry 
broadly as the sector that designs and/or manufactures electronic components and/or 
products containing electronic components (see，for example, Reif and Sodini 1997)�. 
Defined this way, the electronics industry poses a crucial case on Hong Kong's 
upgrade performance as much for its outstanding achievement in the territory as for its 
vivid illustration of the contrasting performances among the four NIEs^. 
1 Not only does the definition ensure comparability, but its broadness is alsojustifled on three grounds: 
1) it captures the very nature of electronics firms in Hong Kong (and also in the region) that a clear-cut 
boundary can hardly be drawn; 2) it includes a wide range of products to facilitate a study on industrial 
upgrading; and 3) it increases the diversity of the population to fit the research focus ~ the prevalence 
of a set of organizational characteristics across industrial sectors in a locality. 
2 The outstanding performance of electronics industry is quite a consensus in Hong Kong. For 
examples，Kwong 0997) finds it among a few other industries that have significantly upgraded 
technology amid massive relocation, Ng (1990) also highlights its remarkable improvement in 
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The Hong Kong electronics industry was one of the frontrunners in East Asia ~ 
by the late 1950s a few multinational corporations (MNCs) have started production in 
Hong Kong. The territory, if not a leader, kept up with the other three NIEs by the 
1970s, only to fall behind in the regional race since the structuring era in the 1980s. 
Quite a number of studies record a resemblance between Hong Kong electronics 
industry and its counterparts in the other three Nffis until the mid-80s (Ernst and 
O'Connor 1992; Hobday 1995; McDermott 1992). Assembly of simple consumer 
gadgets was a common entry point; Hong Kong had been one of the world's leaders in 
transistor radio assembly in the early 1960s, when electronics industries around the 
region were not much different. McDermott (1992) vividly describes this early scene: 
"[E]arly in the 1960s, the electronics industry in South Korea and Taiwan 
consisted of a small number of indigenous manufacturers producing 
vacuum-tube radios for the domestic market... by the end of the 1960s, the 
electronics sector ofboth countries had a much wider product range and had 
shifted its focus to export markets ... in the late 1970s, the electronics 
industry of both countries was skewed towards consumer rather industrial 
electronics" (p.212-3). 
Indeed, the four NIEs all relied on foreign buyers for technical assistance and market 
outlets in the 1970s when their electronics industry took off (Hobday 1995). 
The diversity became increasingly apparent only in the 1980s, the restructuring 
era in which the emergence of new protectionism in the West together with the rise of 
new low-cost competitors in Asia forced the four MEs to reorient their development 
strategies (Chiu 1994). South Korea and Taiwan were subsequently found to be the 
most effective in building a globally competitive electronics industry, but Hong Kong 
was still not far behind by the mid-80s in terms of both production value and 
technology level (Ernst and O'Connor 1992: 95-180). However, over the next decade, 
productivity over the 1980s, and Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (1997) even names it 
the best performer among all manufacturing industries over the past decade in terms of labor 
productivity. 
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Hong Kong stagnated mostly as a contract manufacturer for low-end consumer 
gadgets in the mid-90s. Meanwhile, Taiwan has transformed itself into one of the 
market leaders in various fast-growing sectors including notebook and desktop 
computers, optical scanners, multimedia cards and high-speed modems, to name a 
few notable examples {Business Week May 6, 1996). Likewise, South Korea has 
turned into a powerhouse in consumer electronics, as well as a key supplier for such 
key components as LCD (liquid crystal display) and CRT (cathode ray tube)�. In 
addition, both South Korea and Taiwan have made a bold step ahead in technology 
catch-up, for example, by developing a dynamic semiconductor industry at home 
(Hong 1992). 
The difference in restructuring strategies helps account for such contrasting 
upgrade performances, as the four NDEs all adapted to the restructuring era by a 
combination of three strategies. This strategy set includes: first, expanding outward 
investment and relocating production processes in other developing countries; second, 
raising the level of regional integration in trade; and third, increasing the value-added 
content of their exports and upgrading their industrial structure (Chiu 1994). 
Throughout the last decade South Korea has vigorously shifted its emphasis from 
"imitation strategy" towards "innovation strategy" by intensifying in-house R&D 
(Kim 1997). Likewise, Taiwan has been keen on acquiring cutting-edge capability in 
various technology areas such that a globally oriented strategy is now a real 
possibility for a handful of firms (Lee and Pecht 1997). Even Singapore has 
developed locally a world-class engineering capability in spite of the predominance of 
MNCs, as for example, strong precision engineering industries have been built up 
around the HDD (hard disk drive) sector (Wong 1996). Given Hong Kong's heavy 
3 LCD serves the display function in a wide range of gadgets from calculators to laptop computers, 
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reliance on the relocation strategy (Chiu et al. 1997), its failure in realizing upgrade 
possibilities throughout the restructuring era is not particularly surprising. But here 
we arrive at a real puzzle ~ why did Hong Kong take such radically different 
restructuring strategies from the other three Nffis? 
BEYOND THE MYTH OF FREE MARKET 
Hong Kong's peculiar choice of restructuring strategy may not sound astonishing 
since the former British colony has so often been highlighted across the region, if not 
the world, as an open economy with minimum state intervention. Along with the 
colonial administration which publicizes its so-called "positive non-interventionism" 
(Haddon-Cave 1982), a vast literature attributes its economic success to a well-
functioning free market (Chau 1993; Friedman and Friedman 1980; Lin and Ho 1980; 
Mok 1997; World Bank 1993; WoronofF1986). But as I am about to demonstrate, the 
free-market thesis obscures rather than clarifies Hong Kong's restructuring 
experience no matter how coherent its analysis seems at first glance. 
In line with the portrayal ofHong Kong as a free market, its trade pattem along 
with the industrial structure has been considered to be a confirmation to the principle 
of comparative advantage (Ho 1992; Lin and Ho 1980; Mok 1997). Early 
industrialization by export-oriented manufacturing had everything to do with 
abundant labor supply, whereas economic diversification away from labor-intensive 
activities since the 1970s reflected eroding cost advantage. So did its transformation 
into a regional service center in the 1980s when land and labor costs were surging. All 
in all, economic development in Hong Kong has so far demonstrated efficient 
allocation ofresources by following the evolution of comparative advantage. 
whereas CRT has so far been the prominent type of color picture tube for TV and computer monitors. 
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But whether the manufacturing industry took the "upgrade" or "relocation" route, 
it left Hong Kong with those activities that utilize a higher capital/labor ratio than 
labor-intensive manufacturing, confirming the principle of comparative advantage! 
To avoid circular reasoning of this kind, the free-market thesis has a perfect partner in 
the size-limitation argument because the predominance of small firms is a well-known 
feature of Hong Kong manufacturing sector (Sit 1985; Sit and Wong 1989; Liu and 
Wong 1992). The supplementary argument is straight-forward: small size implies a 
small capital base for in-house R&D, which in turn deters most firms from taking the 
"upgrade" route in the restructuring era. 
Anomalous still, small firms can be so innovative as to constitute the growth 
engine to the "upgrade，route for a region, the "Third Italy" being a notable example 
(Best 1990). To fill the gap between efficient allocation of resources at the economy 
level and strategic orientation at the firm level, free-market advocates seek help from 
the rational-actor model to take relocation as an optimal strategy. Entrepreneurs in 
Hong Kong, whether they are called "merchant entrepreneurs" (Chau 1993) or 
"Kirznerian entrepreneurs" (Yu 1997), are typified to be non-specialists who adhere to 
a short-time horizon with little commitment to any business line. This is to say they 
are always ready to imitate products and make a quick shift to new business whenever 
opportunities emerge. With manufacturing flexibility and market responsiveness of 
this kind giving them an edge in international competition, Hong Kong entrepreneurs 
just prefer the "relocation" to the "upgrade" route. 
To add all this up, free-market theorists make sense of Hong Kong's 
restructuring experience on the basis of the hypothetical working of a free market. 
Entrepreneurs' rational strategies constitute the effective working of a free economy, 
which in turn facilitates rational decision by entrepreneurs, the two reinforcing each 
- 7 -
other as a virtuous cycle to keep Hong Kong in line with its comparative advantage. 
However, I find it more confusing than illuminating if we are to look into how the 
market works in the real world. 
A Sociological Challenge to the Free-Market Thesis 
While free-market advocates highlight Hong Kong's restructuring experience as a 
confirmation of the principle of comparative advantage, they neglect the power 
asymmetry among different players in the market. Underlying the principle of 
comparative advantage is the notion of free exchange, which takes the world as a 
whole to see whether resources are efficiently allocated. By assuming all parties are 
equal this notion obscures the existence of power in market exchange. Not only do 
nations differ in reality in access to information and resources, but market exchange 
per se can also be in theory a mechanism by which international inequality is 
sustained. After all, there may be a conflict between short-run allocative efficiency 
and long-run growth (Ho 1992). As in the case of manufacturing in general and the 
electronics industry in particular where a capability to upgrade is vital for sustainable 
development, a situation in which firms have difficulty upgrading their activities is 
hardly optimal, no matter how efficient they are at their existing form. To take the 
issue of international competition more seriously we need to switch from the notion of 
comparative advantage to competitive advantage. Only then we stand a chance in 
examining the power relationship among different actors in the exchange process, as 
for example, by identifying which party appropriates more economic rents. 
To be fair, the free-market thesis is totally at ease with the notion of competitive 
advantage (see, for example, Enright et al. 1997 for such an analysis on Hong Kong). 
But as long as the rational-actor model remains a core proposition, the free-market 
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thesis can do no much better than simulating the market process in organizational 
vacuum. With all actors presumed rational and all strategic choice presumed optimal, 
a search for the logic of rational choice is prior to contextual understanding of 
economic life, leaving organizational process as a black box. 
As Mark Granovetter (1985) cogently argues, inherent in economic theory is a 
conception of action and decisions carried out by atomized actors so that neither 
ongoing social relations nor wider structures are relevant (see also Swedberg 1997). 
Underlying this conception of the atomized actor is methodological individualism, 
which views collective political and economic behavior as an aggregate consequence 
of individual choice, with social structures originating from individual action. By 
overlooking the decision-making process，economic theory of this kind deprives us of 
what is most needed in order to judge whether a strategic choice is rational. As in our 
case, it is hardly convincing to say that "relocation" is more rational than "upgrading," 
except by a post-hoc deduction. Given industrial upgrading is a global trend, we can 
barely make sense ofHong Kong's peculiar preference for relocation over upgrading 
until we bring the situational and structural constraints facing these manufacturing 
firms into analysis. To account for the lack of industrial upgrading in the electronics 
field, this paper thus goes beyond the free-market thesis by applying a social-
organizational approach instead. 
IN SEARCH OF A SOCL4L-ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 
Four decades ago, March and Simon (1958) had aptly argued against the unrealistic 
assumption of "perfect rationality" inherent in the rational-actor model. Instead, the 
two scholars assert that rationality can only be "subjective" or "relative" in the sense 
that any rational choice is made with a frame of reference which is itself determined 
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by the limitations of the rational man's knowledge. This is to say cognitive elements 
matter in decision-making such that people with different frames of reference will 
make different decisions even under an identical situation. The notion of "bounded 
rationality" thus rejects the "optimization" thesis of economic theory. Rather, 
organizations "satisfy". But the effectiveness justification for formal organizations 
still holds ~ rules and routines are so designed as to minimize the kind of uncertainties 
associated with bounded rationality (Simon 1962). 
If formal organizations are rationally designed as to achieve certain ends, we had 
better ask where those ends originate. It is thus very insightful that James Coleman 
(1993) pushes the social dimension to the center in organizational study, insisting that 
the organizational goal is contingent upon who runs the organization. Indeed, "the 
psychological properties of the persons involved in it, and their interests and social 
relations, must shape its properties" (ibid: 89). In other words, there is no such thing 
as an economic man; we make full sense of a formal organization only by taking it as 
a social organization in which interaction among different social actors shapes the 
way it formulates its organizational goal along with growth strategies. 
Among various key actors, the founder is most often the one who defines the 
organizational goal, and the top management is the group who runs the firm. By 
figuring out the context in which the founder starts the firm together with the 
interactive process by which the top management coordinates daily operation, we can 
make more sense of firm strategies. Because business organizations in a given 
locality are situated in a very similar, if not identical, context — the so-called social-
embeddedness of organizations, we make more sense of a collective strategy by 
looking into the set of structural constrains and growth possibilities available in that 
context. This paper therefore seeks to account for Hong Kong's peculiar upgrade 
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trajectory by uncovering the historical-institutional context in which the collective 
preference for relocation over upgrading prevails. 
GCC Perspective: The World as a Hierarchy 
A growing number of scholars who seek to account for economic transformation in 
East Asia are indeed working on a social-organizational approach that can link firm 
strategies with the global business environment and the local historical-institutional 
context (Chiu et al. 1997; Gereffi, 1995; Orru et al. 1997). Among them Gary Gereffi 
proposes the Global Commodity Chain (GCC) perspective (1994a; 1994b; 1995; see 
also Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994), which serves as a theoretical framework for 
interpreting the upgrade trajectory of a locality. Central to the GCC perspective is the 
concept of commodity chain, ,’a network oflabor and production processes whose end 
result is a finished commodity" (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986: 159). This network 
conception suggests we should no longer take developed and developing countries 
only as leaders and latecomers since these coordinated networks have spanned many 
countries to become global chains. Rather, a holistic view should hold that various 
localities constitute a single network of economic activities within which competition 
exists along with cooperation, and possibility along with constraint. 
Despite adhering to the global framework, the GCC perspective intends to leave 
much room for concrete analysis of local dynamics because it "highlights the need to 
look not only at the geographical spread of transnational production arrangements, but 
also at their organization scope" (Gereffi 1994a: 219). By breaking down the global 
economic structure into an industry- or sector-specific analysis, the GCC perspective 
replaces the core-semiperihery-periphery typology with a concrete analysis on 
varying ways in which different countries are connected to the global system. Two 
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distinct types of GCC are distinguished, namely producer-driven and buyer-driven 
GCCs Producer-driven GCCs are those in which multinational manufacturers play 
the central role in coordinating production networks, typical examples being capital-
and technology-intensive industries like automobile and aircraft. Buyer-driven GCCs 
are those industries in which large retailers, brand marketers and trading companies 
are vital in setting up decentralized production networks in a variety of exporting 
countries, typical examples being labor-intensive, consumer-good industries like 
consumer electronics and garment. 
The notion of power asymmetry is well developed in the GCC perspective; 
GCCs are by nature governance structures, i.e. authority and power relationships that 
determine how financial, material and human resources are allocated and flow within 
the chain. In Gereffi's words, "whereas producer-driven commodity chains are 
controlled by core firms at the point of production, the main leverage in buyer-driven 
industries is exercised at the retail end of the chain" (1994a: 221-2). Simply put, in 
buyer-driven commodity chains most profits come from the marketing end, i.e. 
market research, design, sales, marketing and financial services, while in producer-
driven commodity chains economic rents are retained in the production end through 
tight control over technology- and capital-intensive process. As a GCC is so 
hierarchically organized that core companies appropriate most economic rents by 
monopolizing those activities of the highest value-added, industrialization in a 
locality may merely mean an entrance to the lowest rank in a stratified network of 
economic activities. Therefore, the GCC perspective takes up industrial upgrading as 
a key issue by abandoning the production conception of development for an analysis 
on a much wider range of economic activities. 
On the conceptual level, industrial upgrading in a locality can be viewed as a 
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shift from one node to another along the commodity chain that involves higher-value 
added activities. A list of these roles can be identified, namely 1) primary commodity 
exports; 2) export processing zone (EPZ); 3) original equipment manufacturer (OEM); 
4) original design manufacturer (ODM); and 5) original brandnamed manufacturer 
(OBM). Whereas industrialization involves a shift from role #1 to #2，industrial 
upgrading can be interpreted as a shift from role #2 through #5 as it implies a higher 
degree of competitive capability (Gereffi 1995). Table 1.1 elaborates with reference 
to buyer-driven GCC, in which the EPZ role just involves assembly - the lowest-rank 
task that adds least value across the chain. A switch from EPZ to OEM requires 
sophisticated manufacturing capability as well as full-fledge supply networks, 
whereas design expertise is the precondition for any transition from OEM to ODM. 
Upgrade to OBM is final because that means getting rid ofbuyer's monopolization on 
the marketing end by selling under house brand. 
Table 1.1. Upgrade in Activities by Role Shift in a Buyer-driven GCC 
Roles in a Buyer-driven GCC 
EPZ OEM QDM OBM 
Activities Assembly Assembly; Assembly; Assembly; 
Packaging; Packaging; Packaging; 
Prototyping; Prototyping; Prototyping; 
Product Testing; Product Testing Product Testing; 
Procurement; Procurement; Procurement; 
Shipment Shipment; Shipment; 




By highlighting the possibility of role shift in a stratified network, the GCC 
framework hints at an articulation between global restructuring and local upgrading. 
On one hand, major changes in the international political economy opening 
possibilities for developing countries to industrialize or upgrade (see, for examples, 
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GerefFi and Korzeniewicz 1994). On the other hand, the initial mode of insertion into 
the GCC exercises a path-dependent effect on a locality. With the restructuring era 
releasing the bottleneck between roles along a commodity chain, a certain number of 
junior partners can take the chance to shift to a higher-ranked role by strengthening its 
organizational competence. As Gereffi (1997) aptly puts it, "upgrading does not 
occur to a random set of high value-added industries or activities, but rather to the 
next links in the commodity chains in which countries are embedded" (p. 3). 
But how does a locality become capable of realizing upgrade possibilities in the 
global restructuring? With the upgrade mechanism unspecified, we can never tell 
which locality would be more likely to shift to a higher-ranked role along a 
commodity chain. Worse, we produce no answer to the question ofhow a commodity 
chain as a governance structure remains stable over time. The puzzle is 
straightforward: a GCC will be highly unstable if upgrade is possible for all, provided 
any governance structure implies control from "core" corporations along with 
resistance from "periphery" firms. A supply-side argument at the firm level is 
therefore urgently needed if the GCC perspective is not to rely on a functional 
explanation, following in the footsteps of early world-system theory. This is why I 
seek help from organization theory to tackle two related questions: first, how the 
ongoing process at the local level contributes to the stability of a commodity chain; 
and second, what constitutes the capability for industrial upgrading in a locality. 
Linking Local Dynamics to Global Continuity 
The idea of "resource-dependency" ~ an organization is always dependent on its 
environment for resources ~ should help explain the stability of a commodity chain. 
As discussed in the previous section, a GCC constitutes a network in which dominant 
- 1 4 -
overseas buyers (or producers) on the demand side determine what to produce by 
whom, and domestic manufacturers on the supply side in turn depend on these orders 
to continue their operation. In other words, overseas buyers (or producers) control the 
critical resources which domestic manufacturers must acquire to survive. According 
to PfefFer and Salancik (1978; see also Salancik and PfefFer 1977), a resource-
dependence relationship has two important implications: first, control over critical 
resources provides external organizations with power over the focal organization; and 
second, those who manage to acquire those critical resources for the focal 
organization have more control over intra-organizational process. The concept of 
"external control of organization" may contribute to a detailed analysis on how inter-
organizational process works across a GCC (cf. Lai 1998). However, my paper would 
rather take "power in organization" as a starting point for making a linkage between 
global continuity and local dynamics. 
The resource-dependence perspective offers a useful framework for 
organizational analysis, especially on the lateral dimension of power, i.e. power 
among functional departments (Boeker 1989; see also Perrow 1970; Fligstein 1990). 
As regard to the question of who gets power in an organization, the resource-
dependence perspective suggests that it should be those subunits most capable of 
furnishing critical resources. While this seems common sense, Salancik and Pfeffer 
(1977) added that those who get power can hold onto it once they come into power, 
because "in organizations there are obviously opportunities for defining certain 
activities as more critical than others" (p.9). Therefore, those subunits may enhance 
their own survival through control over critical resources, placement of allies in key 
positions, and definition of organizational problems and policies in line with their 
interest, capability and belief. This is to say subunit interests may become 
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institutionalized in an organization such that subsequent structural inertia may deter 
the organization from adapting to environmental change. 
But as just mentioned, what constitutes the critical task for an organization is not 
so much a technical problem, but is rather subject to definition by power holders. 
Then we should ask who comes to power in the first place and how do they define 
what problems the organization has to tackle. Yet Boeker (1989) insightfully points 
out that the resource-dependence perspective often inclines towards studying 
conditions currently faced by the organization, largely overlooking the historical 
dimension in general and entrepreneur influences at founding in particular. Hence he 
highlights the founder's past experience in influencing the form of the organization 
s/he creates: 
"It is likely that founding entrepreneurs will structure their organizations 
according to their own past experiences and beliefs. The founder's past 
experience will help shape how he or she feels about the relative 
importance of specific functions to the organization" (p.392). 
Here we come to a path-dependence argument that helps explain how an 
industrial firm may be trapped in a particular, sometimes sub-optimal, organizational 
form. When an entrepreneur starts a new firm, s/he organizes it in a way s/he believes 
would best achieve those critical tasks, thus setting an organizational form around 
which the firm evolves later on. Functional staffs whom the founder considers most 
capable of fulfilling those tasks gain power from the outset, and subsequently stand a 
chance in extending their dominance in the organization by controlling information 
flow，designing co-ordination routines, defining growth possibilities and/or 
formulating development strategies. As long as acceptable results are achieved, the 
entrepreneur (and the top management) is likely to take the existing mode ofoperation 
for granted. With problems defined and solutions sought on the basis ofthis existing 
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mode, the organization is set towards a path-dependent development. 
This path-dependent argument explains how dynamics in local organizations act 
as a stabilizing element in a GCC. In the case ofbuyer-driven GCC, an entrepreneur 
who starts a firm to serve as OEM is likely to regard dealing with overseas buyers as 
the most critical organizational task. Those who monopolize this function ~ sales 
and marketing staffs in most cases ~ may turn out to have more control over the 
decision-making process. From then on the firm revolves around an organizational 
form in which the sales/marketing department has more power than other functional 
departments in directing strategic development. As long as sales/marketing staffs 
remain keen on spotting business opportunities in the OEM marketplace, the firm has 
its organizational capability built around the need of its buyers. As a result of its 
attachment to the OEM role, the firm becomes handicapped in switching to other roles 
even when upgrade opportunities are available. After all，the stability of GCC is made 
possible only by the self-confinement of local suppliers to a narrow scope of 
activities. 
Social Selection of Organizational Model 
By discussing how structural inertia locks a firm in a path-dependent development, I 
do not mean to preclude the possibility of organizational transformation. But should 
this happen, a perceived crisis is the precondition for the firm to re-conceptualize 
those taken-for-granted ways of doing business (Fligstein 1990; see also Grove 1996). 
With structural inertia very likely to last for years, if not decades, in most industrial 
organizations, a study on how an organizational form emerges and prevails in an 
industrial field should help figure out the upgrade capability in a locality. 
Of much relevance here is the institutional approach whose primary emphasis is 
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on unpacking how organizations are embedded in the institutional context (Orru et al. 
1997; Scott 1995; Whitney 1992; Zysman 1994;). Inherent in this approach is a 
contention that the wider institutional setting constrains the way firms organize, and 
in turn gives rise to a prevalent organizational form that shapes the economic 
performance of a locality. A handful of empirical studies deserve a bit more 
discussion here. In a comparative study on France and Germany, Maurice et al. (1986) 
articulates how national institutions ~ the education domain, the business 
organizational domain and the industrial relation domain ~ vary to shape the way 
industrial firms organize production and manage work relations in each nation. 
Likewise, Orru et al. (1991) demonstrate that business organizations in Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan are structurally similar within each society but are strikingly 
different across societies. In essence, this study argues that the three Asian societies 
each has a distinctive context of fiscal, political and social institutions that limits and 
directs the development of business organizations, resulting in organizational 
isomorphism towards the fittest form within each society. 
While these scholars, among others, examine why an organizational form 
prevails in a given society, some others pay more attention to how the prevalent form 
shapes industrial performance in a locality. Saxenian (1994) sets an example in 
investigating why the Silicon Valley outperforms Route 128 in the US high-tech 
industries with reference to variations in regional institutions and corporate forms. 
Simply put, a network-based collaboration of small firms in the Silicon Valley 
promotes collective learning, flexible adjustment and continuous innovation, while 
the independent working of vertically-integrated large firms in Route 128 turns out to 
be too rigid to make adjustment in the increasingly fast-changing market. 
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Reinstating Organizational Ecology 
Linking local institutional environment with organizational performance does 
constitute a useful framework for further studies on industrial competitiveness, but the 
danger is that we overlook the persistence of qualitatively different organizational 
forms in a locality (or even an industry) when we seek to explain only 
homogenization. On one hand, the homogenization thesis ignores the inertial force in 
individual organizations (Hannan and Freeman 1977 & 1984). One the other hand, 
we risk adhering to a conception of social actors that is too static, constrained and 
over-socialized to understand how institutional change is activated (Powell 1991; see 
also Hirch 1997; Stinchcombe 1997). Consider the case of Hong Kong where an 
institutional configuration of an organizational model that fails to upgrade has been 
identified (Chiu et al. 1997). This homogenization thesis implies that Hong Kong 
stands no chance in industrial upgrading, overlooking the persistence of some other 
firms that are organized in qualitatively different forms but perform better in 
industrial upgrading. Worse still, we put ourselves in "bad-faith" when Hong Kong 
seems destined to underachieve in industrial upgrading (see Berger 1963 for "bad 
faith”). 
As Walter Powell (1991) aptly advocates, a more productive approach would 
take both homogenization and variation into consideration, i.e. to take the competitive 
nature among different organizational forms as a point of departure. Here I find the 
imagery of organizational ecology useful by conceptualizing an industry as a field 
where we can identify a handful of qualitatively different organizational forms, each 
built upon a distinctive growth orientation (Barnett and Carroll 1993). The thesis that 
only one dominant organizational form prevails in a field still holds, but not so much 
as the result oftransformation and imitation by existing organizations. Rather, it is the 
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consequence of more organizations succeed and fewer fail in that particular form than 
is the case for alternative forms -- selection rather than adaptation (Hannan and 
Carroll 1995). 
To clarify why such competing organizational forms usually co-exist without 
turning into manifest conflict in the field or society level, a distinction between 
"institutionalization as an outcome" and "institutionalization as a process" by 
DiMaggio (1988) should help: 
"Institutionalization as an outcome places organizational structures and 
practices beyond the reach of interest and politics. By contrast, 
institutionalization as a process is profoundly political and reflects the 
relative power of organized interests and the actors who mobilize around 
them" (p. 13). 
This is to say competition of this kind is usually latent because firms are often 
embedded in a historically specific institutional context where one organizational 
form has already gained legitimacy -- institutionalization as an outcome. That 
particular form benefits from an affinity with the local institutional framework, as 
well as greater power to mobilize institutional support than other competing forms. 
Its prevalence is therefore likely to continue, or even be speeded up by imitative 
behaviors of new entrants. But other organizational forms may persist, albeit in a 
marginal status, because there are always some actors who uphold different business 
orientations. 
The notion of "institutionalization as a process" sheds light on the issue of how 
an organizational form gets legitimated by crowding out other competing forms. 
Hence an appropriate research strategy is to trace the natural history to see the rise and 
fall of different organizational forms. Two empirical works exemplify such an 
attempt. First, Piore and Sabel (1984) demonstrate how institutions in US evolved 
around the mass-production paradigm to preclude its craft-production opponent 
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throughout the 20^ century until the early 1980s. Second, Fligstein (1990) examines 
how the interplay among managers, firms and the state altered the "conceptions of 
control" from one type to another that transformed the US corporate sector over the 
past two centuries. In essence, these two seminal works uphold that 
“institutionalization as a process" activates only in "turning points", i.e. when the 
industry gets started or when the take-for-granted way of doing business is in crisis. 
A Sociological Account on Industrial Transformation 
To summarize, I suggest looking into the evolution of an organizational field, which 
serves as a meso-level analysis that bridges the gap between the global level on one 
hand and the firm level on the other. To make sense of the upgrade trajectory of a 
locality, we should examine how an organizational form comes to dominate an 
industrial field in the first place, and how it sets the direction and pace for industrial 
development thereafter. To figure out how an organizational form prevails in an 
industrial field, we should first of all turn to a historical analysis that puts 
entrepreneurs into context by outlining the set of structural constrains and business 
opportunities available in the industrial field since its very inception. Because 
competition among different business orientations is the most manifest at this stage, 
we can identify different organizational forms by examining the variety of these 
orientations in the field (Fligstein 1990). 
The business orientation of each firm is often manifested in its choice of growth 
strategies during its formation years (see, for examples, Boeker 1989 and Grove 1996). 
Among various orientations that may be found in an industrial field, I construct three 
ideal types with reference to the three functions that are key to any industrial firm 
(Perrow 1970), as listed in Table 1.2. First of all, the "research orientation" upholds 
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constant research and ceaseless innovation, advocating research-driven strategies like 
basic research, product development and/ortechnology application as the best growth 
strategy. Adherents are likely to be those who come from the "technology domain," as 
for examples, those with formal training in engineering or science disciplines, and/or 
those with a technical background. Second, the "sales orientation" advocates getting 
more products and/or services sold, embracing sales-led strategies like market 
diversification, product differentiation, etc. Adherents are likely to come from the 
"market domain" such as those with sales and marketing experience and/or those from 
a trading background. Third, the "production orientation" aims to get the production 
more efficient and less costly, upholding such production-centered strategies as 
automation, vertical integration and/or industrial engineering. Adherents are likely to 
come from the "production domain", as for examples, former craftsmen, industrial 
engineers and factory managers. 
Table 1.2: The Three Idea Types ofBusiness Orientations in the Industrial Fiek 
Business Potential Advocates The Strategic Inclination 
Orientation 
Research Constant Adherents to the technology Evolves around research 
Orientation research and domain, likely to include those activities including basic 
ceaseless who are trained in research, technology 
innovation engineering, science and/or application and product 
other technical disciplines development 
Sales Getting more Adherents to the market Intends to increase sales 
Orientation products domain, likely to be those with by product 
and/or sales and marketing differentiation, market 
services sold experience and/or those from a diversification and the 
trading background likes. 
Production Getting the Adherents to the production Aims at streamlining the 
Orientation production domain, likely to include those production, as for 
more efficient closely involved in the examples, by automation, 
and less costly production function, e.g. industrial engineering 
industrial engineers, craftsmen and vertical integration, 
and production managers 
Source: see text 
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Legacy matters in the competition. With global restructuring during the post-
war era opening new opportunities for many a locality to develop their economic 
activities, it is the local response that sets up its own industrial field. After all, the 
pre-existing socio-economic setting in a specific locality is often organized around 
some economic activities at the expense of others, delimiting the range of possible 
roles it can take up in the international division of labor. As a result of the mode of 
insertion into the global economy, local people from different functional backgrounds 
(thus with different orientations and capabilities) have different chances in setting up 
an industrial firm, and industrial firms with different business strategies have different 
chances in seizing these growth opportunities. Those who are better posited to seize 
these growth opportunities are more likely to prosper, and subsequently gain a 
majority status by spreading their business strategies across the field. 
Also beyond the reach of any individual actor is the institutional context where 
resources necessary for organizational building are available. Of greater relevance is 
a set of critical institutions ~ the so-called proximate institutions ~ which directly 
enables and constrains firms to structure their organizations and formulate their 
strategies. This institutional context comprises the state support system for industry, 
the financial system, the labor market arrangement and the education system (Whitley 
1992; Zysman 1994; Chiu et al. 1997). Adherents to different business orientations 
require quite different sets of resources to flourish, as for examples, the research 
orientation requires abundant supply of engineering and technology experts, and the 
production orientation needs craftsmen and technicians. By offering a set of critical 
resources, the institutional context in effect controls the chance of survival among 
different organizational forms. 
Under a historically specific institutional context all three organizational forms 
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may profit (note that I am saying organizational forms but not organizations), but they 
are deemed to have different rates of success and failure. Hence the industrial field 
evolves in a way that one organizational form eventually prevails in both terms of 
absolute number and relative size, paralleled by the approval of its way of doing 
business by the wider society. Alternatives may persist, despite becoming less likely 
than the dominant one to benefit from institutional support. From then on 
"institutionalization as a process" pauses, leaving the dominant form to take charge in 
the field until another turning point. 
HONG KONG ELECTRONICS REVISITED 
It is my major contention that there persists an organizational form in the electronics 
field ~ the sales-led form, whose contribution to Hong Kong's early success in 
international subcontracting also constitutes its later failure in industrial upgrading. 
The electronics industry has a long history in Hong Kong dating back to the late 1950s, 
making it one of the oldest around the region. Its early success is well documented, 
with the drastic growth in the 1970s demonstrating its excellence in international 
subcontracting. But its eroding competitiveness is nonetheless shown by a sharp 
decline of local production since the mid-80s. However, the vast majority of local 
industrial entrepreneurs still stuck with the subcontractor role even when they have 
enlarged their scale after relocation: 
"Hong Kong electronics industry manufactures mature products for 
OEM markets when prices have eroded to a point where the original 
manufacturers can no longer make an acceptable profit margin. Since 
Hong Kong companies can quickly ramp up lower cost manufacturing of 
these products, they can enjoy higher profit margin. Though continuous 
improvement of their manufacturing techniques Hong Kong companies 
can significantly extend the time over which an acceptable profit margin 
can be achieved. After the product price erode beyond an acceptable 
profit margin the company finds new mature products to begin the cycle 
again" (Reifand Sodini 1997: 188). 
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By developing an account on the persistence of these sales-led subcontractors over 
decades we understand why Hong Kong took such a radically different path to 
industrial upgrading from the other MEs. 
Data and Method 
In line with my intention to link firm strategies with the global business environment 
and the local institutional context, this thesis is built upon data at various levels. First, 
I map out the upgrade trajectory of various electronics sectors in Hong Kong by 
making use of government statistics on industrial production and domestic exports 
over the past two decades. Second, to uncover the organizational ecology where we 
see the rise and fall of different organizational forms, I trace the growth trajectory of 
practically all listed electronics firms on HKSE by examining their IPO documents 
and annual reports. Third, to grasp the organizational process I conducted personal 
interviews with key executives of six local firms selected on a theory-driven basis. 
This historical study also draws on references ranging from academic studies to 
government-sponsored consultant reports, businessjournals and newspaper reports. 
To start with, this thesis arrives at a detailed assessment on the upgrading 
performance of the Hong Kong electronics industry over the past two decades by re-
categorizing government statistics into a finer grouping of product segments. As for 
statistics published in Survey of Industrial Production (Hong Kong Census and 
Statistics Department 1978-96), four-digit product groupings -- the finest grouping as 
published ~ are classified into five categories to facilitate sector analysis, namely, 
consumer electronics, parts and components, computer products, office automation 
equipment and others. As for statistics published in Hong Kong Trade Statistics 
(Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department 1978-1996), the finest groupings as 
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published ~ five- or six-digit depending on years of publication ~ are classified into 
three product categories, namely, audio-visual products, computer products and 
semiconductor devices. By classifying the production and export statistics into 
meaningful product segments, this thesis provides strong evidence for showing the 
pattern of industrial upgrading in the electronics field over the past two decades 
(further details on product classification schemes are provided in relevant tables and 
figures). 
Central to the understanding of the industry's peculiar upgrading pattern is the 
evolution -- both homogenization and variation ~ in the organizational field. In an 
ideal world, either drawing on publicly available statistics or doing a survey would be 
find. But in fact, not only does the Hong Kong government maintain a rather narrow 
scope of industrial statistics, but Hong Kong industrialists never seem comfortable 
with responding to survey research, especially when the questionnaire is long. To 
make ends meet I trace the growth trajectory of practically all publicly-listed 
electronics firms on the basis of qualitative data that include IPO (initial public 
offering) documents, annual reports, newspaper reports and/or articles in books and 
journals. To categorize these firms into a meaningful typology, each case is coded 
according to variables such as founder background, business claim, business 
orientation, top management formation and competitive performance (see Appendix 1 
for details on the coding scheme, the typology and data on each firm). The data set 
includes a total of 53 home-grown companies, deliberately leaving out those with a 
foreign origin and those entering the electronics field through merger. 
Though the data set covers only a relatively small portion of the organizational 
field, it is an effective way to assess the likelihood of success and failure ofdifFerent 
organizational forms in the electronics field as a whole. Not only does it uncover the 
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persistence of qualitatively different organizational forms in the field, but it also 
makes a perfect control over the size effect on corporate success. As all companies in 
the data set have grown from a relatively humble to a well-established scale in their 
course to public listing, the convergence of organizational features among these firms, 
if found, indicates which organizational form is the most likely to lead to corporate 
success in the field. To fill the gap between this 53-firm data set and the 800-strong 
electronics field, this study draws on various secondary sources ranging from 
academic studies to government-sponsored consultant reports, business journals and 
newspaper reports. After all, the data set is used to illustrate the organizational field 
and its evolution over the years, not to represent it. 
Last but not least, I conduct in-depth interviews with key executives of six 
electronics firms in order to make more sense of firm strategies (see Appendix 2 for 
the interview schedule). With the six firms each selected on a theory-driven basis, 
interview data shed light on how organizational structure and dynamics vary to lead to 
diverse upgrade trajectories among Hong Kong electronics firms. For a small number 
ofcases are covered, I never mean to generalize a pattern from interview data. Instead, 
these cases are only used to make sense of the pattern we have identified through other 
data sources. After all, interview data not only help illustrate how subcontractors get 
locked into labor-intensive manufacturing, but also show how a few local firms excel 
as a frontrunner in certain market niches largely as a result of their distinct 
organizational forms. 
Chapter Organization 
From looking into the formation of the local electronics field through the 1960s to 
1970s we contextualize the emergence of sales-led subcontractors. The legacy as a 
trading port paves the way for Hong Kong's early integration with the global 
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economy through a closely-knit commercial network. Its manufacturing sector, the 
electronics i ndustry being no exception, has from the very beginning been connected 
to the global economy through overseas buyers. Chapter 2 maps out its upgrade 
trajectory with reference to its decade-long subcontractor role in the international 
division of labor. In line with its preoccupation with international subcontracting, 
market responsiveness and manufacturing flexibility, rather than constant product 
development and technological innovation, always constitute the thrust of 
development in the industry. Though we do see limited product upgrade over the last 
three decades, Hong Kong has stagnated as a player at the lower end of the market 
even after upgrade opportunities became more abundant in the restructuring era. 
But if the preoccupation with international subcontracting is associated with the 
lack of industrial upgrading, we had better figure out the mechanism by which local 
subcontractors get locked into labor-intensive OEM. Chapter 3 uncovers the local 
dynamics that makes Hong Kong stagnate in the international division of labor. 
Suffice it to say here, its insertion into the buyer-driven GCC favors those who 
monopolize business contacts with overseas buyers to start up an industrial firm — 
most likely to be executives with trading background and/or sales experience. During 
the early phase of industrialization, the sales orientation is thus likely to prevail in the 
field, and even be speeded up later by spin-off. With sales-led subcontractors 
outnumbering competing organizational forms, the subcontractor orientation governs 
the industrial field as a whole. With the vast majority organizing around the sales-led 
subcontractor form, the electronics field falls into the vicious cycle of working in the 
OEM system, standing little chance in moving away from labor-intensive 
manufacturing. 
Chapter 4 turns to examine why these sales-led subcontractors have been so 
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predominant in the organizational field for so long. After all, the local institutional 
context plays a key role in sustaining the status quo, favoring sales-led subcontractors 
even after the restructuring era in which alternative organizational forms are better 
equipped to capitalize on upgrade opportunities. With the overall institutional 
environment less supportive to the industrial sector than the commercial, real estate 
and financial sectors, there has never been a strong stimulus for systemic 
transformation in the industrial field. In the case of proximate institutions, sales-led 
subcontractors can even take advantage of their majority status to become the primary 
beneficiary. As a result, alternative organizational forms remain so marginal in Hong 
Kong that the electronics field lacks a critical mass to alter its upgrade trajectory over 
the past two decades. 
My thesis is somewhat contrary to the popular belief that Hong Kong is a free 
market wherein efficient allocation of resources at the economy level always go hand 
in hand with rational choice ofbusiness strategies at the firm level. In the concluding 
chapter I will reaffirm my stance by showing how the dominant model undermines 
sustainable growth even at the firm level. Along with evidences contrary to the free-
market thesis, the social-organizational approach prevails by virtue of a concrete 
micro-macro linkage. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HONG KONG AS A FOLLOWER IN THE REAR 
THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY IN RETROSPECT 
The colonial and trading legacy gave the Hong Kong electronics industry a first-
mover advantage during the era of the New International Division of Labor fNIDL), 
connecting it to the global economy through international subcontracting and, to a 
lesser extent, foreign direct investment (FDI). Ironically, its early insertion into the 
global economy is only followed by its stagnation as a cost-based competitor in the 
OEM marketplace for decades. To look back, the industry never took advantage of its 
earlier lead to catch up with the regional race by moving towards high value-added 
activities but only excelled in the OEM role by flexibly responding to whatever 
expansion room emerged on the low-end market. While product upgrade of limited 
scale is recorded time and again over the past two decades, neither process innovation 
nor technology catch-up has gone far enough to alter its status as a follower in the rear. 
Even after massive relocation has multiplied its overall scale in the 1990s, Hong Kong 
electronics industry still sticks to labor-intensive manufacturing (Chiu et al. 1997). 
Early Integration with the Global Economy 
Quite a number of scholars attribute Hong Kong's early industrialization to its trading 
port legacy (see, for examples, Chiu etal.l995 & 1997; Henderson 1989; Lin and Ho 
1980; Sit and Wong 1989). The period of colonial development as a trading port has 
at least two major influences on Hong Kong's post-war industrialization. First, local 
merchants were allowed to grow alongside with British ones to perform an 
intermediary role between Hong Kong and the West. The presence of these merchants 
and their extensive business networks in turn constituted a solid foundation for later 
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industrial development. In addition, the entrepot trade bequeathed Hong Kong with 
transport and communication facilities, as well as the relatively efficient and stable 
administrative machinery. These combined to give Hong Kong an apparent 
advantage in connecting to the global economy. Therefore, migrant entrepreneurs 
from Shanghai did not take long to establish a dynamic export-oriented textile 
industry in Hong Kong when international trade became more liberal, multilateral and 
interdependent in the post-war era. Likewise, when firms in advanced countries 
searched for low-cost production sites around the world in the 1960s, Hong Kong 
moved even faster than Singapore to seize that golden opportunity to establish its 
export industry (Chiu et al. 1995). 
The electronics industry emerged rather late in Hong Kong relative to the textile 
one, starting only after the era ofNIDL (Henderson 1989). Yet the former British 
colony did lead the region in attracting FDI. A small number of Japanese producers 
already entered Hong Kong in the late 1950s to assemble transistor radios, and by the 
mid-60s, almost every large US consumer good and semiconductor manufacturers 
had established operations in Hong Kong (Hobday 1995). But the prosperity ofHong 
Kong electronics industry has less to do with FDI than the rise oflocal firms. Despite 
a drastic expansion in the 1960s ~ the number of establishments increased from only 
four in 1960 to 230 in 1970 ~ the industry only emerged to be a significant contributor to 
Hong Kong economy after the 1970s, a decade in which the number of establishment 
increased by more than five times from 230 to 1,316, and the value of domestic 
exports by more than twelve times from HK$l,074 million to HK$13,417 million 
(Hong Kong Industry Department 1996). From the mid-70s onwards the surge of 
local firms into a wider product range has constituted the primary source of 
production and employment in the industry (Hong Kong Productivity Centre 1983). 
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In the meantime, the relative share ofMNCs in total exports fell from 93.4% in 1970 to 
37.6% in 1981, and their share in total employment, from 77.8% in 1970 to 27% in 
1981 (ibid: 17). All in all, local firms have been driving the development of Hong 
Kong electronics industry over the past two decades. 
But a global force lay behind the local scene; the dramatic growth in this earlier 
phase just shows another fast absorption of Hong Kong by the NEDL. Indeed, 
Gregory (1985) attributes that the rapid growth oflocal production as the achievement 
of a working alliance developed between local entrepreneurs and large mass 
merchandisers in major North American and European markets. Likewise, the Hong 
Kong Productivity Centre (1983) noticed by the early 80s that the remarkable growth 
in the 70s had very much to do with the successful implementation of a set of 
strategies oriented towards overseas buyers for consumer electronics: 
"The existing Hong Kong electronics industry has grown and 
prospered through a pattern that has evolved over the years. With few 
exceptions, the industry has been based on offering competitively 
priced private label goods typically assembled from imported 
components. The main attribute of the Hong Kong electronics 
industry is its ability to deliver styling and product changes in time to 
meet buyer demands in the fad segment of consumer electronic 
products" (Foreword). 
This is to say, the electronics just followed most other manufacturing industries 
in Hong Kong to get connected to the global economy primarily through international 
networks of commercial subcontracting (Berger and Lester 1997; Chiu et al. 1997; 
Epsy 1970; Sit and Wong 1989; Yu 1997). Hong Kong's pioneer status in international 
subcontracting is indeed demonstrated by the fact that the territory's first electronics 
company ~ Champagne Engineering Corporation ~ started to assemble transistor radios 
for Sony of Japan in 1959 (Chen 1971). From then on most local firms just prospered 
through participating in a form of international subcontracting arrangement in which 
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they produce according to the requirements of orders/contracts received from 
international sourcing agents (Hobday 1995). To use Gary Gereffi's terms, Hong 
Kong electronics industry has been linked up to the global economy by taking up the 
OEM role in buyer-driven GCC 
Growth without Catch-up 
But while the fast success in the OEM marketplace did bring Hong Kong a dynamic 
electronics industry, it did nothing to strengthen Hong Kong's competitive performance 
in the regional race. Instead, the growth paralleled a transformation of industrial 
structure towards consumer products in general and fad products in particular, 
pointing to the failure of Hong Kong electronics industry in moving towards high 
value-added activities. Due to the predominance of labor-intensive activities, local 
production had lost its momentum not long after costs stood higher than neighboring 
regions in the 80s. 
By the early 80s Hong Kong electronics industry was found to be oriented 
towards consumers electronics, a direction opposite to that of Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore, among others, where high value-added sectors like computer, 
office automation and industrial electronics had then been major growth areas (Hong 
Kong Productivity Centre 1983). In fact, the share of consumer products in Hong 
Kong electronics exports increased sharply from 52% in 1974 to 71% in 1980, and 
that of parts and components decreased from 48% to 29% over the period (ibid:13-4). 
The trend persisted to make consumer electronics a consistent leader among all 
electronics sectors. As shown in Figure 2.1, consumer electronics constituted over 50% 
of the industry's gross output throughout the 80s, followed by parts and components, 
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with computer products comparatively insignificant in that regarcf. Not until consumer 
electronics showed a sharp decline since 1988 did the other two sectors catch up slowly. 
But in terms of number of firms, consumer electronics has not been challenged ever 
since the late 1970s, as Table 2.1 shows that the sector often exceeded, and sometimes 
was even double or triple, the sum of all other sectors in the 1979-95 period. 
Figure 2.1: Gross Output of Major Sectors in Hong Kong Electronics 
Industry at 1990's Constant Price, 1979-95. 
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Note: The constant price is calculated by deflating the nominal price by the volume index as listed in 
Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (1998) Estimates of Gross Domestic Product. 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, Survey of Industrial Production. 
•‘ Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department does not use such categones as I use in this chapter. To 
facilitate sector analysis, Consumer Electronics includes "electronic toys," "electronic watches and 
clocks，’’ "transistor radios," "television receivers and communication equipment," "sound reproducing 
& recording equipment and apparatus"; Parts and Components include "electronics parts and 
components," Computer Products include "computmg machinery and equipment"; OfficeAutomation 
Equipment includes “office machinery and equipment except computing and accounting machinery," 
and Others include those electronics products not elsewhere specified. 
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But the predominance of consumer electronics did not coincide with a better 
competitive performance. Quite the opposite, the sector has consistently been weaker 
than the computer and component sectors in value-added ability, measured by value-
added as a percentage of gross output (Figure 2.2). This explains why the Hong Kong 
Productivity Centre (1983) discovers a plunge in value-added per unit sale in the 
electronics industry during its fast growth in the 1970s, with the figure falling to 
around 25% of the output value in 1980 from an average of 30% between 1973 to 
1977 (ibid.: 11 -2). A much steeper drop in consumer electronics in the late 80s in both 
gross output 5^igure 2.1) and number of firms (Table 2.1) further confirm its relative 
weakness. By contrast, the component and computer sectors, both of which include 
comparatively higher value-added activities, recorded steadier employment during the 
80s; the computer sector even showed an increase in number of firms. 
Table 2.1: The Scale ofMajor Sectors of Hong Kong Electronics Industry, 
1979-95. 
Consumer Parts and Computer Office Industrial Others 
Electronics Components Products Automation Apparatus 
Equipment 
Year No. of No. of No of No. of No. of No. of No. of| No of No. of| No. of No of|No. of 
Firms persons Firms pcreons Firms persons Firms persons I'irms persons Finns ereons 
engaged engaged engaged engaged engaged ngaged 
1979 757 ~ N ^ ~ l 5 3 ” N M “ 4 2 ~ N ^ 3 ~"NM 2 ”N7A 90 N/A 
1980 956 N/A 348 N/A 16 N/A 4 N'A 11 N/A 83 N/A 
1981 1442 N/A 347 N/A 13 N/A 21 N/A 12 N/A 98 N/A 
1982 1267 N/A 394 N/A 21 N/A 8 N/A 16 N/A 95 N/A 
1983 1524 80869 456 29788 40 10517 17 208 19 523 161 2684 
1984 1575 76493 469 32969 99 14841 17 283 28 605 91 4222 
1985 1295 60177 326 30218 133 11936 12 175 4 519 189 8538 
1986 1217 56397 515 35793 97 8691 26 1007 101 435 227 6971 
1987 1032 57835 561 37718 74 8142 26 1270 24 421 273 7598 
1988 943 48938 533 38566 111 14524 41 2262 53 386 223 6786 
1989 912 42596 508 35440 101 13810 24 1584 14 163 221 5652 
1990 733 33200 372 24363 213 21495 20 2050 52 324 112 3613 
1991 677 22782 313 22638 158 16431 40 2228 33 357 64 2074 
1992 677 19235 313 22695 158 12146 40 2051 33 174 64 1647 
1993 434 15825 242 21994 105 10790 53 2593 19 162 38 1199 
1994 403 12270 175 19539 119 9280 52 3520 17 179 40 1136 
1995丨 405丨 9277| 1 7 3 | l 8 4 2 l | i23| 9437[ 63] 3448丨 i s | 137| 25 653 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, Survey ofIndustrial Production. 
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Figure 2.2: Value Added as a Percentage of Gross Output in Major Sectors of 
Hong Kong Electronics Industry, 1979-95. 
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Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, Survey ofIndustrial Production 
Despite outperforming consumer electronics, both the component and computer 
sectors have yet to claim a satisfactory competitive performance by international 
standards. The fact that the local electronics industry has long relied heavily upon 
imported parts and components points to the weakness of the component sector. With 
critical components often imported from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, US and Europe, 
less than halfofthe total purchased materials are composed oflocally available parts 
(Dataquest Inc. 1991: IV-9). Likewise, the computer sector remains a junior partner in 
international trade, as a recent government-sponsored consultant report on Hong Kong 
electronics industry found ^Boston Consulting Group 1995): 
'The majority of establishments in the Computers & Peripherals sector in 
Hong Kong assemble products from the key component level and do not 
themselves hold any significant proprietary technologies. The products 
manufactured in Hong Kong are usually "mature" (i.e. essentially 
commodities) or in the consolidation stage, with the Hong Kong 
companies generally belonging to the lower tier group of competitors 
who compete on a cost basis' (p.80-l). 
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Figure 2.3: The Growth Trend ofHong Kong Electronics Industry, 1979-95. 
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Note: The constant price is calculated by deflating the nominal price by the volume index as listed in 
Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (1998) Estimates of Gross Domestic Product. 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, Survey of Industrial Production 
After all, the electronics industry as a whole failed to upgrade production as well as 
to catch up with its competitors throughout the 1980s. Squeezed by intensifying 
competition on the one hand and surging local costs on the other, the industry faced a 
downturn from the mid-80s onwards (Figure 2.3). A look at Figure 2.1 confirms that 
consumer electronics took the lead in the downturn, but statistics from Table 2.1 shows 
that both computer and component sectors did little more than postpone the decline of 
local production. Therefore, the late 80s through early 90s saw a sharp decline in both 
gross output and number of firms (Figure 2.3). 
Entering the Made-by-Hong-Kong Era 
The sharp decline throughout the last decade in a way reflects Hong Kong's failure in 
catching up with South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore on the one hand, and the 
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intensifying competition from Thailand and Malaysia on the other (Dataquest Inc. 1991; 
Boston Consulting Group 1995). But most of all, the decline of local production is 
resulted from a collective strategy in the industry ~ production relocation in Mainland 
China -- in face of a surge in local production costs since mid-80s. With most firms 
taking the relocation route instead of the upgrade alternative, offshore production has 
multiplied at the expense of local production in the 90s, marking the era of"made by 
Hong Kong" (Berger and Lester 1997). 
A study on industrial investments in the Pearl River Delta conducted by the 
Federation of Hong Kong Industries confirms the trend of relocation (Federation of 
Hong Kong Industries, Industry & Research Division 1992). Almost 70% (69.4%) of 
the electronics establishments covered by the study have investment in the region (ibid: 
63), with the average employment size of these relocated establishments being 905 
persons (ibid: 69). In terms of investment, electronics firms in the Pearl River Delta 
tend to concentrate in two clusters (ibid: 67). At the one end, there are small and 
medium-sized firms with capital size of less than HK$5 million (39.2%). And at the 
other, there are larger firms with capital size more than HK$20 million (20.8%). These 
findings indicate that the strategy of going offshore is by no means confined to larger 
firms. Given the geographical proximity between Hong Kong and the southern China, 
many small and medium-sized firms can 'make use of the abundant supply of labor 
there to reduce production cost, (ibid: 67). As a result, the majority of the FEE in 
Guangdong are Hong Kong based. The Boston Consulting Group (1995: 10) estimated 
that Hong Kong backed electronics firms accounted for 77% ofall electronics firms or 
83% of all electronics Fffi in the province. By the 1990s the scale of Hong Kong 
backed electronics firms in Guangdong has even far exceeded those remaining in Hong 
Kong; that is why the MIT research group call it “Made by Hong Kong，， B^erger and 
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Lester 1997). 
By moving their labor-intensive processes to Mainland China, local 
manufacturers are turning their operation in Hong Kong into controlling headquarters 
(Chiu et al. 1997). R&D activities are mainly conducted in their Hong Kong 
establishments, and more sophisticated processes are also retained in their Hong Kong 
premises while assembly is done in their offshore plants. Therefore, even though the 
industry shows a sharp increase in the value-added per person from the late 1980s 
onwards, Hong Kong has hardly introduced systemic transformation in its industrial 
activities (see also Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department 1993). Quite the 
opposite, the majority still remain largely OEM suppliers for overseas buyers (Berger 
and Lester 1997; Chiu et al. 1997; Enright et al. 1997; Hobday 1995; Hong Kong 
Industry Department 1994/95/96). Given their business contacts with local 
subcontractors and manufacturers based in Mainland China, some Hong Kong 
manufacturers have even turned into traders, and in some cases, assume only the role as 
sourcing agent for transnational corporations (Berger and Lester 1997; Hong Kong 
Census and Statistics Department 1996). Even for those better-performing firms 
which have upgraded to ODM, their in-house design activities range only from 
hardware design to software programming, mechanical drawing, building prototype 
samples and tool-making. Only occasionally are they involved in industrial or 
conceptual design, while successful upgrade to Own Brand Manufacturing (OBM) is 
even rarer (HKTDC, Research Department 1997). Not surprisingly, Hong Kong's 
status as a cost-based competitor in the international marketplace remained unchanged, 
as the Boston Consulting Group (1995) notes: 
"The Hong Kong domestic electronics industry is among the smallest in 
the region, and is the only one which has been contracting in real value 
over the past five years. In terms of capabilities, the Hong Kong industry 
is grouped with the new low-cost manufacturing bases in Thailand, 
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Malaysia and China as a cost-based competitor with relatively few 
capabilities in product innovation and development” (p.l99). 
INERTL4 IN UPGRADE AS A STRATEGIC CHOICE 
IfHong Kong has stagnated over the past three decades as a cost-based competitor in 
the international marketplace, it may well be the case that the territory kept doing 
what it did best - international subcontracting. After all, "local manufacturers have 
traditionally profited from moving quickly in and out of products and markets" 
(Dataquest Inc. 1991: IV-64). On one hand, its strength lies in quick response to market 
changes ~ most producers can complete product designs in less than twelve months and 
produce from order to shipment in less than six months (Dataquest Inc. 1991: Appendix 
IV-15). On the other hand, they are more reliant on market intelligence than 
advancement in core technological development for survival, catching up with recent 
development of parts and components by acquiring them in the market instead of 
internalizing such processes of production (Chiu et al. 1997). With the constantly 
changing international division of labor offering ample opportunities in various 
market segments, Hong Kongjust expanded into those product lines given up by other 
advanced countries when the latter upgrade their product portfolio: 
'Most electronics companies in Hong Kong have exploited the low-cost, 
flexible manufacturing engine ... The emphasis has been on producing 
electronics products which have already been created and accepted by 
the market, and doing so with lower manufacturing costs. At some point 
in the product life cycle, the creators of these products, which usually 
have higher manufacturing costs, no longer earn what they consider to be 
an acceptable profit margin. The market demand for the products, 
however, remains. At this point，Hong Kong companies, with their 
low-cost, flexible manufacturing can quickly fill the gap and produce 
these products at a higher profit margin. Of course, over time, this profit 
margin continues to erode even for the Hong Kong companies. At that 
point, the Hong Kong companies quickly begin producing other 
products with acceptable profit margins, and the cycle goes on，(Berger 
and Lester 1997: 202). 
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Collective Preoccupation with Low-end Market 
Underlying Hong Kong's excellence in international subcontracting is a strategic 
preference for following in the rear over catching up with other rivals in the 
international race. The most illustrative case of such strategic preoccupation with the 
low-end market is probably the audio-visual (AV) sector, a consistent leader in Hong 
Kong electronics industry. 
Hong Kong started the assembly of transistor radios in the late 1950s, making it 
the first Asian economy outside Japan to develop consumer electronics (Gregory 
1985:12). Closely following the invention of the radio cassette recorder in the mid-
70s and the introduction of stereo systems in 1979, Hong Kong radio production was 
in full swing in the late 70s through 1981 when there were some 400 firms in the field 
(HKTDC 1984b). By the late 70s, Hong Kong had even risen to share with Japan the 
leadership in the world's radio production by almost dominating the lower end ofthe 
market (Gregory 1985: 9-13). 
But while Hong Kong was the first to benefit from Japan's upgrade from simple 
to multifunctional audio products, its propensity to catch up in the international race 
kept slowing as Japan moved further upwards to such items as digital audio 
equipment, color television and video-tape recorder. In fact, simple radios ~ portable 
radios, clock radios and portable radio recorders -- dominated Hong Kong domestic 
exports of audio-visual products throughout the 1980s (Figure 2.4). Higher value-
added items including car audio, color TV and VCR/VTR had never come close to 
even halfofthe export value of simple radios before the late 80s. While massive 
relocation resulted in the decline of simple radios since the late 80s, other product 
segments performed not much better. By the late 80s there was virtually no VTR 
manufacturer in Hong Kong, with only several TV manufacturers producing mostly 
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14-, 20- and/or 21-inch color models (HKTDC, Research Department 1990). The 
audio segment was, as usual, a bit better than its video counterpart, with a few 
manufacturers already developing CD players in 1989 (ibid). However, even when 
quite a few manufacturers are producing laser-based audio equipment by the mid-90s, 
radio receivers are still the only AV product for which Hong Kong claims to be the 
world's leading exporter (HKTDC, Research Department 1997). 
Figure 2.4: Hong Kong Domestic Exports of Major Audio-Visual Products at 
1990's Constant Price, 1978-96. 
5,000 
4,500 - 圖 
4,000 - I 
3,500 - _ I I 
g 3,000 - I 二 I I g^ 
I 2,500 -
的 鬮 驪 
B 2,000 - | I 
1，1 n I 
1 , 0 0 0 -| I 圓 
0 - L i f c - M |W" 1 ^ • , h " J , J L m , _>_^-rT^  
1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 
Year 
• Simple Radios • Other Audio Products 
• Car Audios 圓 Color TV 
• Mono TV m VCR/VTR 
Notes: 
1) Each category in this figure is composed of more than one 6-digit items listed in Hong Kong Trade 
Statistics. Simple Radios include "portable radios with sound recorders", "portable radios" and "radios 
with clocks"; Other Audio Products includes "radios with hi-fi and sound recorders", "radios with hi_ 
fi’，，other gramophone and record player", cassette tape sound recorders", "audio frequency electric 
amplifiers", "amplifier units nes", dictating machine sound recorder nes", other sound reproducing 
apparatus"; Car Audios include "car radios with sound recorders" and "car radios"; Color TV includes 
"colour TV", "colour TV combination", portable colour TV，，"portable colour TV combination"; 
Mono TV includes "mono T V , "mono TV combinations", "portable mono TV' and "portable mono 
TV combinations"; and VCR/VTR includes "TV sound/image recorders and reproducers". 
2) The constant price is calculated by deflating the nominal price by the volume index as listed in Hong 
Kong Census and Statistics Department (1998) Estimates ofGwssDomestic Product. 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, HongKong Trade Statistics 
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Figure 2.5: Hong Kong Domestic Exports of Computer Products at 1990's 
Constant Price, 1978-96 
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"complete microcomputer system", "complete digital central processing unit", "complete 
microcomputer digital central processing unit" and "data processing equipment nes"; Peripheral 
comprises "peripheral units, control and adapting units", input or output unit" and "storage unit"; and 
Computer Parts and Components comprises “ parts nes of automatic data processing machines", 
electronic components for computers", and "parts nes of the computer products": 
2) The constant price is calculated by deflating the nominal price by the volume index as Usted in Hong 
Kong Census and Statistics Department (1998) Estimates of Gross Domestic Product. 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, HongKong Trade Statistics 
Astonishing as it may sound, the computer industry poses a more similar than 
different case from the audio-visual sector. Some local R&D projects on personal 
computers had already started as early as in 1978 (HKTDC 1984a), but this early 
effort earned Hong Kong only a humble computer industry until the early 80s. With 
the launch of the first JBM PC system in mid 1982 came the "PC revolution," and 
Hong Kong was again fast to capitalize on the growth opportunities to embark its 
position in the international marketplace by multiplying its exports in just a couple of 
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years (Figure 2.5). In 1984 there were already 20 to 30 companies involved in the 
manufacture of personal computers in Hong Kong (ibid.). These manufacturers came 
from a diverse background ranging from audio product to electronic watch and even 
garments, demonstrating Hong Kong's flexible adaptation to international market 
changes. Despite the fact that most oflocally designed products fell into the low end 
of the market (ibid: 3), the territory did enjoy enormous growth throughout the 1980s 
as a follower in the rear (Figure 2.5). By the late 80s Hong Kong might even claim a 
healthy computer industry, producing both desk-top and lap-top PC systems, as well 
as all kinds of peripherals including keyboards, monitors, disk drives, modems, 
memory cards, various add-on cards, and even printers (HKTDC, Research 
Department 1988). 
Yet Hong Kong computer manufacturers never caught up in the technology race, 
following the footstep of its audio-visual counterparts. As technological capability 
took charge in the multimedia boom in the 1990s, the territory could barely claim a 
steady business only in parts and accessories, and to a much lesser extent, in 
peripherals (Figure 2.5). This assessment remains valid even we take the massive 
relocation into consideration, as most Hong Kong backed manufacturers in 
Guangdong are still engaged in the production of computer parts and accessories likes 
motherboards, add-on cards, disk controllers, keyboards, multimedia cards, CD-ROM 
drives and game controllers (HKTDC, Research Department 1997). 
Even the semiconductor sector travels on quite the same trajectory in Hong Kong. 
As in the case of consumer electronics, Hong Kong was the first Asian economy 
outside Japan to get into the semiconductor industry (Gregory 1985). In an attempt to 
defend themselves against Japanese rivals, Fairchild led the US semiconductor 
manufacturers to seek cost-competitive production sites in Asia by the early 60s, the 
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first choice being Hong Kong, 'the only location that then offered the essential 
conditions for a successful assembly operation' (Mackintosh Consultants Ltd 1982; 
71). By the late 1960s the territory had become the principal assembler of 
semiconductors in Asia for the US market (Henderson 1989: 98). By the early 80s 
three or four local firms had acquired fabrication capability of up to four-inch wafers 
for LSI (large-scale integration) devices (Mackintosh Consultants Ltd 1982: 72). 
Figure 2.6: Hong Kong Domestic Exports of Semiconductor Devices at 
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2) The constant price is calculated by deflating the nominal price by the volume index as listed in Hong 
Kong Census and Statistics Department (1998) Estimates of Gross Domestic Product. 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, HongKong Trade Statistics 
The strength of Hong Kong's semiconductor industry in the earlier phase is 
shown by the fact that even a very large part of these semiconductor devices were 
- 4 5 -
consumed locally, the annual export value amounted to no less than HK$1,000 million 
throughoutthe 1980s (Figure2.6). By 1986 there were already 21 companies in Hong 
Kong engaged in semiconductor manufacturing (of which six are locally owned), 
making the territory an emerging core of the regional division of labor (Henderson 
1989: 112). 
Throughout the 1990s Hong Kong has indeed expanded in testing and packaging 
activities, as shown in the export value of mounted IC (Figure 2.6). Ironically, Vitelic 
ofTaiwan and Motorola ofUS formed ajoint venture in Hong Kong in 1996, only to 
make memory ICs generations behind the technological frontier, even though watch 
& dock ICs, voice & melody ICs and electronic toy ICs have been fabricated locally 
for nearly 20 years (HKTDC, Research Department 1997). This is to say, the Hong 
Kong semiconductor sector remains only a follower in the rear, especially when we 
bear in mind the success ofboth Taiwan and South Korea in technological catch-up. 
These episodes all point to a strategic preference for international subcontracting 
in the Hong Kong electronics industry (see also Chiu and Wong 1998 for a similar 
case in the LCD sector). The fast start in the 1970s demonstrates how effective the 
business model is in the earlier phase of development, with the subsequent decline of 
local production pointing to the systemic limit of cost-based competition. Most 
interesting of all, Hong Kong survived the challenge not by industrial upgrading, but 
instead, by revitalizing the business model through massive relocation. The 
predominance of small firms is not as much a factor as the persistence of 
subcontractor orientation, as the strategic preference for international subcontracting 
lasted throughout the "made-by-Hong-Kong" era when the average scale has become 
much larger. . 
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Table 2.2: Leading Export Items ofHong Kong Electronics Industry, 1978-96 
1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 
ist LCD watch LED/LCD Computer Quartz Quartz Computer Mounted IC 
(1.88) Watch(4.27) Parts(6.13) Analog Analog Parts (12.06) 
Electronic Electronic (12.12) 
Watch (7.07) Watch(11.71) 
2"d Portable Computer Quartz Computer Computer Part Part for RF Computer 
Radio(1.85) Parts (3.09) Analog Part (5.38) (9.63) Apparatus Part (7.22) 
Electronic (7.51) 
Watch (3.12) 
^~~~Clock Radio Portable LEDA.CD~~Portable Radio Part Electronic~~Electronic~~~ 
(1.47) RCR(1.99) Watch (2.98) RCR (2.35) (3.22) Watch Watch (5.80) 
^ 
^~~Computer~~~Portable Portable Radio Part~~~TV Part (2.56) Mounted IC Part for RF 
Parts (1.33) Radio (1.98) RCR(1.87) (2.30) (6.70) Apparatus 
(3.85) 
5th Portable Clock Radio Portable LED/LCD Computer Printed Printed 
RCR (0.99) (1.49) Radio(1.82) watch (2.29) System (2.37) Circuit Circuit 
(2.58) (3.23) 
6th Transistor TV Game Telephone Telephone Mounted IC Cassette Cassette 
(0.72) (1.46) Set(1.80) Set(1.78) (1.95) Tape Sound Tape Sound 
Recorder Recorder for 
for Office Office Use 
Use(1.67) (2.02) 
7th Mounted IC Quartz Radio Part Video Tapes Printed Part for Part for 
(0.61) Analog (1.63) (1.47) Circuit (1.92) Audio Audio 
Electronic Equipment Equipment 
Watch (1.28) (1.67) (1.95) 
^ ~ ~ P o c k e t Mounted IC Clock Radio Color TV Radio Transistor~~Transistor^ 
Calculator (0.86) (1.34) (1.45) Telephonic (1.46) (1.87) 
(0.60) Receiver 
0 ^ 
9th TV Game Cassette Mounted IC Portable Static Static Other 
(0.49) Recorder (1.15) Radio (1.33) Converters/ Converters/ Semicon-
(0.64) Rectifiers Rectifiers ductor 
(1.65) (1.38) Device 
(1-44) 
10让 Cassette Electronic Computer Computer Photocopying Part for Part for 
Recorder Clock (0.59) Peripheral System Apparatus Telecom Telecom 
(0.47) (0.86) (1.20) (1.55) Equipment Equipment 
(1.23) (1.26) 
Note: Figures in each bracket denotes the value in HK$ billion at 1990's price, calculated by 
deflating the nominal price by the volume index as Hsted in Hong Kong Census and Statistics 
Department (1998) Estimates of Gross Domestic Product. 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department HongKong Trade Statistics 
Collective Inaction in Industrial Upgrading 
The strategic preoccupation with international subcontracting is so persuasive in the 
field that Hong Kong electronics firms did little to transform their status as a cost-
based competitor even when upgrade opportunities became abundant in the 1980s. 
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Product upgrade is limited, whereas process innovation and technology catch-up are 
so lacking that relocation became “the only means for the electronics manufacturers to 
survive. In order to stay cost competitive, they have to move to PRC" (Dataquest 1991: 
IV-28). A look at the leading export items over the past two decades confirms the 
clustering ofHong Kong electronics firms around mature and/or fad products whose 
profit margins necessarily stagnate, if not decline, as time goes on (Table 2.2). 
Notable examples include LCD/LED watches and TV games through the late 70s to 
early 80s, telephone sets during the mid-80s, video tapes in the late 80s, radio 
telephonic receivers (including such telecommunications equipment as CB radios and 
transceivers) through the late 80s to early 90s, among others. Apart from consumer 
products, the part and component sector follows a similar path, with the early 90s 
seeing the rise of discrete components (static converters, rectifiers and transistors), 
printed circuits together with parts and components for RF apparatus (i.e. TV and 
radio), audio equipment and telecommunications equipment. 
While product upgrade is of humble scale, process innovation and technology 
catch-up are even more lacking. Dating back to the 1970s when international 
subcontracting emerged to predominate in the field, the industry's expenditure on 
technology development (including product design and process improvement) was 
already small relative to its scale. It is especially true in consumer electronics, as the 
whole sector spent only HK$13 million in product design and process improvement in 
1978 (Hong Kong Productivity Centre 1983: 32). Hence it is justified to suggest that 
"the industry has not been accumulating experience and know-how in technology 
development" (ibid). 
The industry did not report satisfactory performance even in quality control, as 
one of the very few research reports done in early 1970s with a focus on that 
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production process in Hong Kong electronics industry (Chiu 1973) discovers: 
“[A] large amount of effort and costs has been devoted to the 
prevention and internal failure sectors of the quality control 
exercise ... sampling plans are determined subjectively and passively 
to meet the customer's need (p.lO) ... One can conclude from these 
figures that Hong Kong is not quite up to date in organizing Q.C. 
activities (p.l5)". 
Even by the mid-80s, there was still a lack of awareness in quality control in most 
SMEs in Hong Kong, as found by Sit and Wong (1989): 
"For most SMI entrepreneurs, it is evident that much attention has 
been paid to new machinery as a cure for production and technological 
problems …their perspective on improving technology is very 
narrow . •. When asked about their opinion on low cost automation, 
2/3 of the sample firms claimed that they had not heard of it..." 
(p.168-70). 
Table 2.3. Gross Addition to Fixed Assets as a Percentage of Gross Output 
ofHong Kong Electronics Industry, 1983-95. 
1983|l984| 1985| 1986| 1987| 1988| 1989| 1990| 199l| 1992| 1993| 1994| 1995 
Office N/A -0.03 28.23 40.20 10.69 3.32 3.13 8.51 8.14 4.21 -2.19 4.16 5.53 
Automation 
Equipment 
Computer N/A 3.23 0.57 5.73 3.14 4.08 5.14 2.87 1.78 2.30 3.12 4.51 4.29 
Products 
Consumer 0.51 2.04 2.18 1.63 3.08 3.51 2.49 2.18 2.90 2.97 1.54 2.98 1.46 
Electronics 
Parts and 4.83 6.36 5.42 6.16 5.66 6.66 7.34 10.36 7.29 8.78 9.21 9.76 8.27 
Components 
Industrial 3.62 7.17 5.63 15.48 18.46 3.51 14.23 2.44 13.68 15.13 N/A 0.50 0.78 
Apparatus 
Others N/A 6.02 2.58 3.47 6.79 3.47 2.36 -2.60 1.79 3.51 N/A 3.21 1.91 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, Survey of Industrial Production 
Even though Hong Kong manufacturers are supposed to prefer installation of 
new machines to other forms of process innovation, the performance of electronics 
industry through the early 80s to mid-90s in gross addition to fix assets seems much 
less than satisfactory (Table 2.3). It is again most evident in consumer electronics, 
whose investment in fix assets seldom exceeded 3% of its gross output. The 
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computer sector was not much better, averaging an annual rate of just 3.39% over the 
period. Even though the part and component sector showed a better record, it had a 
significantly higher rate only after the 1990s when massive production relocation 
tends to exaggerate the ratio between gross addition to fix assets and gross output. 
Not surprisingly, a study report on industrial automation done in early 90s found 
Hong Kong lagging two to three years behind Taiwan and Singapore in upgrading to 
SMT (surface-mount technology) by using automatic pick-and-place machines (Hong 
Kong Productivity Council 1992): 
"In the area of hard automation, the level of automation ofHong Kong 
electronics industry lags slightly below the optimum ... on the whole, 
the industry invests in hard automation equipment if forced by their 
buyers, instead of continually seeking out opportunities to add extra 
value for，and hence extra value from, their customers" (ibid: 37). 
Size limitation matters much less than management attitude in process upgrade 
of various types, as a major barrier to automation in Hong Kong is "the lack of 
appreciation of the contribution of manufacturing operations to the value-added of a 
business in industry" (ibid: 59). In a study on JIT Qust-in-time) system Fong (1992) 
points out the weakness of Hong Kong companies in inventory control, finding 
management's misconception more than anything to have hindered Hong Kong's 
upgrade to JIT system. 
As in the case of process innovation, the intensity of technology innovation — 
usually carried out in a company's R&D section — is weak in Hong Kong (Reif and 
Sodini 1997). In fact, most Hong Kong electronics firms have a relatively weak R&D 
section. Chiu et al. (1997) did a survey in the mid-90s, finding that more than two-
thirds (73.9%) ofelectronics firms employ no more than three R&D professional staff 
(p.64). One may again blame the limitation of SMEs, but even relatively well-
established firms perform not much better in this regard. Yu (1997) found that “large 
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electronics companies in Hong Kong spent money on R&D mostly for the transfer of 
technology or for imitation, not for technological breakthrough or designing brand 
new products" (p.l25). Not surprisingly, even though Hong Kong has been fast to 
switch to CAD (computer-aided design) software in product design, the weakness in 
corporate R&D is so common that the electronics industry was still at its early stage in 
the application of ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) (Hong Kong Industry 
Department 1991). After all, Hong Kong has the lowest R&D spending among the 
"four little dragons," estimated at 0.08% ofGDP in 1992 (Baker and Goto 1998: 256). 
FLEXIBILITY OR RIGIDITY: A SECOND THOUGHT 
Hong Kong electronics industry has indeed thrived over the past three decades, the 
1970s being the take-off stage, with the next two growing at much slower rate. 
Certainly a relatively small base helps record that remarkable expansion in the 1970s, 
but the slower growth thereafter cannot be explained merely by resorting to a larger 
base value. Indeed the relative decline of industrial competitiveness is shown by the 
fact that Hong Kong's growth rate throughout the 80s is much smaller when 
compared to what is achieved by South Korea, Taiwan and even Singapore over the 
period (Dataquest Inc. 1991). Even though the Hong Kong electronics industry has 
long been renowned for its flexible adaptation to market change, the territory did little 
to transform its role in the global division of labor as an OEM supplier in low value-
added sectors, even after upgrade opportunities has become more abundant from the 
1980s onwards. 
After all, Hong Kong electronics is so attached to international subcontracting 
that its lack ofupgrading effort through process innovation or technological catch-up 
confines itselfto the status as a follower in the rear. This is exactly why one may take 
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flexible adaptation to frequent market change as a "Hong Kong Advantage" (see, for 
example, Enright et al. 1997; and Yu 1997), while others may just doubt whether a 
strategy of this kind is sustainable (see, for example, Berger and Lester 1997; and 
Chiu and Wong 1998). But if there is any validity in my contention that the 
preoccupation with international subcontracting is associated with the lack of 
industrial upgrading, we had better look into the mechanism through which most local 
manufacturers get locked into labor-intensive OEM. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
UNCOVERING LOCAL DYNAMICS 
If Hong Kong gets locked into labor-intensive manufacturing through collective 
submission to the subcontractor role in buyer-driven GCC, it begs to ask why these 
subcontractor firms are so reluctant to upgrade. Power asymmetry built in buyer-
driven GCC helps explain such inertia on the part of local suppliers; success in 
international subcontracting turns into a deterrent to industrial upgrading so long as 
the existing business arrangement is not supportive in that regard. But unlike many 
other scholars who take Hong Kong's preoccupation with the subcontractor role as 
something self-explanatory — therejust exists many firms that are very well adapted to 
the subcontractor role - this chapter seeks to uncover the lock-in mechanism. After 
all, its stagnation in OEM over decades has been full of dynamics at both the field and 
flrm levels. With the electronics field connected to buyer-driven GCC from the outset, 
those who secure close contact with overseas buyers are best posited to set up an 
industrial firm. With the vast majority of industrial entrepreneurs arising from this 
subcontracting network, the industrial field saw the rapid rise of sales-led 
subcontractor - the organizational model that is set to excel in the subcontractor role 
at the expense of other possible tasks. As it turns out, collective preoccupation with 
international subcontracting becomes collective inaction in industrial upgrading. 
EVTERNATIONAL SUBCONTRACTEVG AS A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
As detailed in chapter 2, Hong Kong electronics industry has since its inception 
engaged in international subcontracting through buyer-driven GCC. With these 
buyers mostly importers, distributors and chain stores aiming at price-competitive 
products，the local industrial field has been linked to a business system in which price 
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rather than quality is the primary concern (HKTDC 1991). It has important 
implications for the local industrial scene because a buyer-driven GCC is by 
definition a governance structure in which buyers decide who to produce what for 
whom. With little hint for upgrade spreading across the network, local suppliers just 
lack an initiative to do so. 
Figure 3.1. Typical Procedures in Reaching an OEM Arrangement 
Establishing Business Contacts 
^ 
Buyer Inspects HK OEM Maker's Company 
Background, Production & Quality Systems 
^ 
Buyer Provides Specifications 
^ 
HK Maker Gives 
Technical Drawings 
Y \|/ 
Buyer's Approval > Making ofPrototype 
. N|/ 
4^ 
Pass Buyer's Tests Negotiation of OEM Agreement 
^ (may occur:) 
Trial Order Buyer Helps Setting 
Up Production 
_l \丨- ^ Facilities 
V L 
^ Quality Checks By 
Satisfy Buyer's Buyer's Engineer 
Reliability Tests ± Stationed in HK 
Increase of Order Size Factory 
Contract Expires ^ 
Renewal/Review of Contract Terms 
Source: HKTDC (1991: p.7) 
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Buyer-driven GCC as Truncated Market 
In Figure 3.1 that typifies an OEM arrangement, we see how unfriendly a business 
environment it is for local suppliers to upgrade their industrial activities. After all, a 
buyer takes overall control over allocation of resources across the business network 
by assigning what to be produced for whom. With virtually no control over how its 
products are distributed, a local supplier can but limit its scope to contract 
manufacturing. While it may on occasion perform some product design for its buyers, 
production upon order more or less exhausts what it is supposed to do in such 
arrangement. This is why I call the buyer-driven GCC a truncated market: a buyer's 
control over the retailing end segregates suppliers from end users; suppliers may 
never receive feedback from end users, whereas end users may never realize from 
which supplier their consumption comes. 
The weakness of local suppliers in marketing and the tight control of overseas 
buyers in distribution are just two sides of the same coin. Underlying this business 
arrangement is such power asymmetry that a buyer's approval is always prior to 
anything done on the part of a supplier (Figure 3.1), leaving most suppliers with few 
choices but to take buyer's orders and sales forecast as the primary source of market 
information. An example is Lai's description of the procedure ofhis own firm, Fook 
Lung Ltd., a 500-staff clock radio maker for organizational buyers since 1982 :^ 
"Ever before we develop a new model, we gather information. This is 
very important, and we usually contact our existing customers and 
potential buyers for advice. Usually, before our customers come to 
Hong Kong to meet us we have already asked for their suggestions. 
Then we form a concept, draft drawings to see what to be refined, and 
prepare mock-ups for their assessment. After their approval, we will go 
ahead for mechanical drawing and mold making... This is typical of 
new product development procedure, in which buyers take a central role 
in providing information on market trends". 
5 All company and personal names in this chapter are changed to assure our interviewees ofanonymity. 
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Information asymmetry ofthis kind helps explain why a local supplier is prone to 
get locked into the subcontractor role. As long as a supplier takes buyers' orders as 
market demand, and buyers' forecasts as market trends, it restricts its operation to 
existing needs of its buyers, letting other business possibilities go unnoticed. 
Illustrative again is the case ofFook Lung Ltd., as Lai explains why the firm has never 
diversified away from clock radios: 
"We often look into the electronics field for business opportunities, 
just being unable to identify a target product. Diversifying into any 
product line may cause difficulty for our firm. Well, the problem does 
not lie in the product, but on market demand ... I often communicate 
with my buyers to see which product line to head for, just to be told 
"none". Therefore, we do what we have been doing well. That puts us 
in an advantageous position. We don't know how risky it is to diversify 
away; to stick to our own specialty is to play safe". 
OEM as Steady Business 
Ifpower asymmetry in an OEM arrangement makes a supplier unlikely to upgrade its 
activities as long as a buyer gives no hint, it begs to ask why a supplier continues its 
engagement with such business arrangement. This leads us away from the 
constraining side to the enabling side of the business arrangement; while excellence in 
OEM may not lead a supplier to industrial upgrading, it is not quite the case in terms 
of corporate growth. Instead, a supplier who satisfy its buyers often ensures stable 
orders through their close ties, winning it much room for expansion (Figure 3.1). 
Forming a long-term partnership with a buyer often wins a supplier repeated 
orders of larger size and longer duration. This is attractive enough for many a 
subcontractor, who are usually keen in forward planning to fully utilize their 
production capacity. As in the case ofTrue Light, its emergence as one ofthe leading 
electronics groups in Hong Kong only followed its rapid expansion in the OEM 
marketplace throughout the late 80s to early 90s. In the words ofPang, its founder 
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and chief executive: 
"Production relocation that facilitated expansion in production capacity 
was the turning point in our group's history. But what made us grow so 
fast was our ability to lure buyers who formerly went to South Korea and 
Taiwan. Their large and stable orders made it possible for us to steadily 
expand our production scale". 
Long-term relationship with a buyer even helps an OEM supplier to outperform 
its rivals, as a few steps can often be skipped in establishing new order arrangements 
with old customers. As Lai details the case ofFook Lung, one of the beneficiaries of 
long-term partnership with overseas buyers: 
“Backed by our long-term customers, we are assured of orders every time 
we release a new model even before we have our molds ready. This puts 
us in an advantageous position against many of our competitors, who have 
to seek orders after they have fabricated their molds. As for us, we can ask 
our customers to make orders just with a draft drawing, permitting us to 
go on to mold making at least with an order size ofbreak-even level". 
After all, a subcontractor is reluctant to move away from the OEM role in 
buyer-driven GCC not only because of the power asymmetry but also because ofthe 
growth opportunities built in the business arrangement. But as long as the OEM 
arrangement remains unfriendly to industrial upgrading, a local supplier may enhance 
its performance as an OEM supplier only at the expense of other possible tasks, and 
hence becomes handicapped in capturing business opportunities outside the 
subcontracting network. As Dataquest Inc. (1991) points out Hong Kong's 
underachievement in industrial design under the existing business arrangement: 
,[M]ost ofthe respondents were involved in electronic system designs 
and the design of mechanical parts. In most cases, the designs were 
worked out according to the product specifications and product 
cosmetics provided by the parent companies or the customers. Only 
halfofthe respondents performed product cosmetic designs for some of 
their products, and design of tooling and molds were not widely 
provided by the respondents' (IV-20). 
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Collective Attachment to the Subcontractor Role 
To add all up, the more a subcontractor leans towards satisfying buyer's needs, the 
less likely it becomes capable of pulling away from the subcontracting network. But 
this helps account for Hong Kong's lack of industrial upgrading only if the majority of 
local firms did build their competence around the needs of their buyers. This reminds 
us of a number of scholars, who identify a peculiar business orientation that helps 
drive local manufacturers closer to the subcontractor role (Chau 1993; Chen 1995; 
Hamilton 1997; Yu 1997). Among them is the pioneering study ofChau (1993), who 
typifies Hong Kong entrepreneurs as "merchant entrepreneur": 
“A merchant aims at securing income or wealth by the exchange rather 
than the production of goods . •. the process may involve fabricating or 
manufacturing. But ifhe has no interest in the commodity itself, or in the 
wants it satisfies; if the discovery excites him solely because ofits profit 
potential, so that when the undertaking ceases to bring in supernormal 
profits he will not hesitate to dump the project, then he is what I call 
merchant entrepreneur" (p. 23-5). 
As regards personal and behavioral traits, a merchant entrepreneur is thus likely 
to be a non-specialist who adheres to a short time horizon with little commitment to 
any business line. This contrasts with an industrialist who "competes on the strength 
of the quality of his product, or on cost effectiveness ... [and] takes pride in his 
product" (p.25). In response to those who query why Hong Kong industries continued 
to specialize in labor-intensive products when "late-comers" like Korea and Taiwan 
shifted to more capital- and technology-intensive products, Chau simply replies: “this 
ceases to be a surprise if we know how the merchant entrepreneurs operate" (p.27). 
Echoing Chau is Yu (1997), who uses more systematically collected data in his 
monograph to substantiate the contrast between two ideal types ofentrepreneurs -- the 
"Kirzerian entrepreneurs" who adhere to "adaptive response" as compared to 
"Schumpeterian entrepreneurs" who prefer "creative response". The predominance of 
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"Kirzerian entrepreneurs" in Hong Kong is argued to be the driving force behind 
economic change over decades. As in the case of electronics industry, these Kirzerian 
entrepreneurs thrive by their alertness to business opportunities such that they rush to 
the most popular products with low value added, low profit margins but a quick return. 
After all, two thirds of the electronics firms covered by Yu's survey in 1994 have been 
and would continue to be OEM suppliers. This is to say Hong Kong's stagnation in 
the OEM role has its root in strategic orientation at the firm level: 
"Indeed most Hong Kong firms are market driven, depending less on 
advanced technology and more on predefined product market 
guidelines to direct their business activities ... It is worth noting that 
even] large electronics companies in Hong Kong spent money on 
R&D mostly for transfer of technology or for imitation, not for 
technological breakthrough or designing brand new products" (p. 125). 
UNCOVERING LOCAL DYNAMICS 
Most acknowledge the prevalence of"subcontractor orientation" ofthis kind in Hong 
Kong's manufacturing sector as a whole (see, for example, Enright et al. 1997 for a 
similar assessment), only to ask where it originates. As we are about to show, legacy 
matters a lot in selecting a group of industrializing agents whose attachment to OEM 
business is constituent of the persistent prevalence ofthe "subcontractor orientation" 
in the field. With the trading legacy came a far-reaching buyer/trader network that 
eased Hong Kong's insertion into buyer-driven GCC during the post-war era. 
Consequently, the manufacturing sector evolved around a buyer-driven, trader-
mediated subcontracting network in which local industrial firms could get more 
products sold simply by getting more orders from overseas buyers and/or local traders. 
Thanks to this peculiar mode of industrialization in which a fast lane to success in 
international subcontracting is available, the subcontractor model outgrew other 
alternative business models in the industrial field by attracting hundreds of 
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newcomers and spin-off firms to follow. With the majority of industrial firms being 
so attached to a business arrangement that is unfriendly, if not hostile, to constant 
upgrading, it is no surprise that the electronics field has failed to generate any 
systematic transformation over the years. 
Traders as Industrializing Agents 
Hong Kong was a colony built by the British as a trading port for their commercial 
penetration into the Far East. With the colonial legacy comes an extensive 
institutional network for handling commercial transactions that not only contributed 
to the entrepot development before the Second World War, but also served the needs 
ofexport-oriented manufacturing industries during the post-war era (Chiu et al. 1995). 
In particular, this network made Hong Kong a top candidate when mass 
merchandisers (i.e. department stores, large chain stores and supermarkets) in major 
North American and European markets looked for new sources for the most price-
competitive consumer electronic goods in late 50s (Gregory 1985). Technically put, 
this pre-existing commercial network paved the way for Hong Kong's smooth 
insertion into buyer-driven GCC. 
Backed by a web of trading-related organizations, large overseas buyers could 
from the very beginning deal directly with some large manufacturers in Hong Kong. 
But the local trading community did play a vital role in matchmaking most local 
factories to overseas buyers during the early phase of industrialization (Espy 1970; 
see also Sit et al. 1979; Sit 1985). To illustrate I quote in length from Espy (1970), 
whose pioneering research in business strategies ofHong Kong manufacturing sector 
turns out to be a rare documentation ofthis earlier industrial scene^: 
6 As Espy did not single out the electronics industry in his study that covers only 3 electronics firms in 
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"Almost all of Hong Kong's export production is for buyers who 
represent manufacturers, wholesalers and retail chains in the market 
countries. The Hong Kong manufacturer is often simply a contract 
producer ... production is almost always against firm orders, never for 
stock ... He is concerned only with fmding foreign buyers who will 
give him contracts for producing items he is equipped to make 
(p.61) ... If the buyer is experienced and is placing a large order for 
one or several similar items, he will know which Hong Kong 
manufacturers are capable of filling his orders satisfactorily and can 
thus seek his own quotations …Smaller buyers, especially those 
interested in a variety of different items, often find it to their 
advantage to channel their buying through the export buying office of 
a large British trading company such as Jardin-Matheson, Gilmans or 
Dodwells (p.63-4) ... There are several thousand trading companies in 
Hong Kong ... Most of these firms are owned and operated entirely by 
Chinese, but there are also Indian, Pakistani, American, British, 
Australian and Canadian companies offering buying services for 
overseas customers (p.66)". 
In other words, Hong Kong's manufacturing industry has from the very 
beginning evolved around a three-tier system in which overseas buyers give orders, 
traders make matches, and factories perform production upon orders. Under this 
system most buyers are isolated from local producers, except that a handful of large 
overseas buyers maintain relatively close ties with renowned Hong Kong 
manufacturers. Usually, an overseas buyer sends a trade inquiry to a trading house, 
which then gets several quotations from local manufacturers (on an F.O.B. basis) and 
submits to the buyer one quotation under its own name (on a C.I.F. basis). Ifan order 
follows’ the trading house places its own order with the Hong Kong firm, and then 
assumes all responsibilities for inspection prior to packing, shipping, insurance and 
export documentation. Without these trading houses, it is hardly imaginable how 
small buyers from all over the world could make contact with thousands of 
anonymous factories in Hong Kong (Espy 1970，see also Sit et al. 1979). 
The incorporation of Hong Kong's manufacturing into buyer-driven GCC 
a total of27cases. my paper does not inlent to make generalization from his study. 
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through a trader-mediated network in turn fostered the growth of subcontractor firms 
by paving them a fast lane to success in the OEM marketplace. With abundant 
business opportunities spreading across the subcontracting network, it requires little 
technical or business know-how for a subcontracting firm to get more 
products/service sold by seeking more buying orders. The only imperative to secure 
orders may well be the mastering of general-purpose production equipment that 
ensures flexible adjustment to customers' orders for a variety of products. This is 
indeed what Espy (1970) identifies as a common way to do business in the 60s: 
"[F]inding foreign buyers who will give him contracts for producing items 
he is equipped to make. He wants contracts which are large enough to 
permit economical production quantities and provide the incentive and 
means to grow ... He is usually eager to obtain repeat business, as this 
requires a minimum tooling and employee training costs. These problems, 
rather than retail distribution or attracting consumers, are the major 
concerns ofthe Hong Kong manufacturer as he seeks orders from foreign 
buyers" (p.61-2). 
The Rapid Rise of Subcontractor Firms 
The institutionalization of a buyer-driven, trader-mediated subcontracting network 
hinted the evolution of the organizational field by cultivating a business environment 
in which factories with a strong presence in that network are assured of corporate 
prosperity. For hundreds of small factories, securing a close ties with trading houses 
often made them more viable than they would otherwise have been (Sit 1985; see also 
Espy 1970; Sit etal. 1979). In fact, many local factories were so small that they even 
could not arrange the clerical people to handle shipping, insurance and documentation, 
and just depended on trading houses as the major, ifnot the only, source oforders. In 
addition to managing export affairs，these trading firms sometimes offer substantial 
assistance to those manufacturers whom they considered to be reliable suppliers, 
handling the purchase ofraw materials and even arranging loans and machinery. As 
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for large firms which usually do not depend on trading houses for orders, their growth 
hinges on an ability to maintain a close tie with overseas buyers. Therefore, a 
common feature among high-growth industrial firms during this early phase is that 
their chief executives personally conduct most negotiations with their buyers and 
many of them traveled extensively to seek buyers in their market countries (Espy 
1970). 
As a result of the priority of business connections, those who had already been 
embedded in the subcontracting network are even better posited to seize business 
opportunities than technical and managerial experts are. It is evident in the 1970s，as 
Sit et al. (1979) report in their survey that around 70% of SME entrepreneurs set up 
their own firms after serving in the industrial sector, and 63.6% of those in the 
electronics industry had their first job exactly in the electronics industry. Sit and 
Wong (1989) reaffirm the pattern in a survey done a decade later: "[t]he typical pattern 
for about 80% of the entrepreneurs is that they worked in one job, accumulating 
capital and know-how, before becoming employers" (p.l04). 
This is to say that the subcontracting network is built with a self-reinforcing 
mechanism; newcomers to the field are likely to join the subcontracting business 
because of past experiences in a subcontractor firm. Though I can find no data to 
detail the background of these spin-off entrepreneurs, the priority of working 
experience over formal training in the likelihood ofbecoming an industrialist in Hong 
Kong does help spread the subcontractor orientation across a field. After all, a salient 
feature ofSME entrepreneurs in Hong Kong is their lack offormal training: around 70 
percent of all respondents have no formal training in either technical or managerial 
know-how, but only acquired this knowledge in their formerjobs (Sit et al. 1979; Sit 
and Wong 1989). Without alternative tool-kits, these spin-ofFentrepreneurs are likely 
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to enter the field only as followers of the subcontractor model. On one hand, the fact 
that 82.8% of these SME industrial firms had an initial proprietor fund of no more 
than HK$200,000 (Sit et al. 1979) implies that they had few choices but to join the 
subcontracting network. On the other hand, it is hardly imaginable how small firms 
like these could have survived without trading houses performing an intermediary 
role between overseas buyers and small industrial firms. 
With the institutionalization of the subcontracting network in which insiders are 
most likely to start up an industrial firm, the subcontractor model does not take long to 
become the dominant business model in the industrial field. After all, the Advisory 
Committee on Diversification (1979) notes that firm strategies had already converged 
by the late 1970s to govern Hong Kong's industrial development as a whole: 
"[E]ach industry includes a large number of small manufacturing 
establishments whose activities are largely responsive to buyers' orders. 
There is a lack of a reasonable number oflarge factories which have the 
capability and incentive to invest in the training of skills at various level, 
and in industrial support facilities and technical back-up services"(p.75). 
Institutionalization of the Sales-led Organizational Form 
In line with this peculiar mode of industrialization in which the subcontracting 
network paves local industrialists a fast lane to success in buyer-driven GCC, the 
organizational form that best fulfills the subcontractor role eventually prevails in the 
field. To take a closer look at the dominant organizational form, I trace the growth 
trajectory ofpractically all publicly listed electronics firms in order to see which set 
of business strategies constitutes its success, as defined by listing on HKSE: To 
typify but not over-simplify，I categorize their business orientations around the three 
functions that virtually all industrial firms perform, namely, sales and marketing, 
7 Based on data availability, I included 53 firms in the profile. As it aims to specify the growth 
trajectory of local firms, foreign groups like China Aerospace, ASM Pacific, Legend and Pro-View are 
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production, and research and development (Table 3.1). Each of the 53 firms certainly 
employs a combination of all three types of strategy in the course to listing. But it 
makes sense to attribute a firm's success to one type of strategy as long as we can 
identify one that is consistently given top priority in its choice of growth strategies. 
While the coding is subject to subjective judgment on qualitative data that include 
IPO (initial public offering) documents, annual reports, newspaper reports and/or 
articles in books and journals, it is by no means ambiguous (see Appendix 1 for 
details). Quite the contrary, the business orientation of a firm corresponds to its 
choice ofgrowth strategies during formation years (see, for examples, Boeker 1989; 
Fligstein 1990; Grove 1996). 
Table 3.1: Functional Categorization of Business Orientations 
Functional Business Orientation Growth Strategy 
Domain 
Sales & Getting more Product Shift and/or Diversification; 
Marketing products/services sold by Market Diversification; ， 
strengthening market Brand Development; 
presence. Distribution Network Building; 
Business Diversification, etc. 
Production Enhancing the competitive Vertical Integration;~~ 
edge in quality and/or Inventory Control; 
efficiency by a focus on the Advancement in Facilities; 
production arena. Automation; 
Quality Assurance, etc. 
Research & Craving a market niche by Product Development; 
Development building an expertise in Product Innovation;， 
(R&D) technological know-how Applied Research;， 
and/or developing Technology Development, etc. 
proprietary product and/or ‘ 
technology. 
Source: see text. 
excluded. So are those getting into the field through merger, Semi-tech and Grande being notable 
examples. 
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Table 3.2: The Typical Path to Success of Electronics Firms Listed on HKSE 
Sector Companies Typical Path to Success 
Consumer Alco; These firms were usually started as a small factory 
Electronics Golden Power; concentrating on the assembly of simple consumer 
Great Wall; goods, transistor radios being the most notable 
Hanny; example. Almost without exception, they relied on 
Hanwah; orders from overseas merchandisers. While their 
Kong Wah; growth hinges on the ability to keep pace with these 
Kosonic; merchandisers in terms of volume, delivery and 
Leading Spirit; quality, their success usually followed a timely 
Luks; release of a big-hit item, as for examples, radio 
Ngai Lik; cassettes recorders in the 80s, magnetic storage 
Orient Power; media in the late 80s, and CD players in the early 
Recor; 90s. Further growth is usually achieved by a 
Starlight; combination of three strategies — sales expansion of 
Tomei; current items, constant search for new buyers, and 
Tomorrow; hunting for next big-hit items. 
Wanon; 
Personal Kinson; These firms were usually started as a small factory 
Electronics Prod-Art; engaging in the assembly of such items as 
RJP; calculators, hand-held games and electronic 
Same Time; watches. Relying on overseas buyers in general 
Sharp Brave; and the so-called "gift market" in particular for 
Truly; orders, they are very likely to shift from one 
Welback; product to another. Their fast growth usually 
followed their quick move to tap into the enormous 
demand for fad products, as for example, LCD 
hand-held games in mid 80s. In addition to the 
three strategies commonly used in consumer 
electronics, these personal electronics firms are 
more likely to assist price competition with product 
differentiation through cosmetic design. 
Parts and AV Concept; These firms were either started asatrading house or 
Components Daiwa small factory to serve local electronics firms. So, 
Associate; they usually concentrated on such basic items as 
Honko; printed circuit boards, capacitors, diodes and 
K&P; resistors. Their growth is a result of two 
Man Yue; environmental factors: first, the expansion in local 
Wing Lee; demand after relocation of other electronics firms; 
Wong's and second, the shift of market leaders towards 
International; more sophisticated parts. Their success hinged on a 
timely expansion in production volume to tape into 
the market demand, with typical examples being 
resistors, diodes and capacitors in the 90s. 
Source: Companies' WO documents and annual reports. 
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There is indeed a typical path to success in the electronics field, the majority --
30 out of the 53 listed companies - traveled on the fast lane to success in buyer-driven 
GCC by adapting to the subcontractor role (Table 3.2). Of these subcontractor firms 
(excluding two cases for which data on the founder's background are not available), 
all except three (i.e. 25 in 28) had from the outset been embedded in the buyer-driven, 
trader-mediated subcontracting network. Almost half of these firms were started as a 
petty workshop to serve the trader-mediated subcontracting network (11 in 25). As 
for the rest, their founders all come from the market domain: they either have a trading 
background before stepping into the manufacturing field (9 in 25) or sales and 
marketing experiences in another electronics firm before spinning ofF(5 in 25/. 
With their rise in the subcontracting network comes an orientation towards 
growth characterized by getting more products/services sold through strengthening 
market presence - sales and marketing orientation. Indeed the reliance on sales 
strategies varies little across sectors, be it consumer electronics, personal electronics 
or parts and components (Table 3.2). The typical pattern: the initial take-offfollows a 
prompt response to overseas buyers' surging order for certain low-margin, large-
volume products, and continuous growth hinges on the ability to make product shiftd 
by seeking orders from current and/or new buyers. Notable examples ofthese big-hit 
products include electronic watches from the late 70s to early 80s, LCD hand-held 
games in the mid-80s, CD players from the late 80s to early 90s, and basic discrete 
components from the early to mid-90s. By contrast, in the remaining 23 firms that 
take alternative paths to success，eight cases lean towards either production-centered 
or research-driven orientation whereas the other 15 cases show somewhat ambiguous 
8 Those started as a petty workshop include Kinson, Luks, Ngai Lik, Prod-Art, RJP, Recor Same Time 
Starlight，Welback, Wing Lee and Wong's International; those founders with a trading background 
include Daiwa Associate, Great Wall, Hanny, Honko, K&P, Kosonic, Leading Spirit, Man Yue and 
Tomei; and those founders with sales & marketing experience include AV Concept, Kong Wah, Orient 
- 6 7 -
strategic orientation (these alternative cases will be discussed in the next chapter). 
Underlying the priority of sales-led strategies in these subcontractor firms is a 
mode of functional integration in which the sales and marketing function takes the 
lead. Indeed the R&D function in virtually all of these firms is so weak and passive 
that a common R&D practice is cooperation with existing/prospective customers in 
improving existing product designs and/or in developing other mature products. 
Seldom are they engaged in conceptual/industrial design, not to mention applied 
research in new technology. Even though the production function often receives 
much attention because sales expansion requires parallel expansion in production, it 
only submits to a subordinate role as its R&D counterpart does. In fact, these firms 
stick to non-dedicated equipment in order to be capable ofshifting among a variety of 
electronics products, showing no interest in building a competitive edge in the 
production sphere itself. After all, these firms rely on sales and marketing strategies 
like product shift and business diversification, largely overlooking the production and 
research alternatives that could help alter their status as a follower in the rear. 
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these 30 sales-led subcontractors remain an 
OEM supplier in buyer-driven GCC despite operating at relatively large scale. Even 
though a few of them have turned into contract manufacturers for such electronics 
giants as Philips, Sharp and Sony, these better performers are still primarily engaged 
in low-margin, large-volume products, which those giants have totally or partially 
ceased producing in-house (see Appendix lB for details). Sounds similar，doesn't it? 
The growth pattern of these sales-led subcontractors is just the mirror image of the 
upgrade trajectory of Hong Kong electronics industry - growth without catch-up. 
Hence we approach a complete account ofHong Kong's peculiar upgrade trajectory 
Power, Sharp Brave and Truly. See Appendix lB for details. 
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by figuring out the organizational process by which their excellence in OEM develops 
hand in hand with inaction in industrial upgrading. 
HANDICAPPED FIRMS IN TRUNCATED MARKET 
The formation of sales-led subcontractors is rooted in the peculiar mode of 
industrialization in which the subcontracting networktakes charge. With the founders 
keen on capturing growth opportunities across the subcontracting network, dealing 
with buyers is defined as the most critical task in these subcontractor firms. As a 
result, functional staffs that best serve this task -- sales and marketing staffs in most 
cases ~ take the lead in strategic formulation, information processing and 
interdepartmental co-ordination. As it turns out, these subcontractors evolve around 
an organizational model that is set to excel in OEM at the expense ofother possible 
tasks ~ the sales-led subcontractor model. 
Sales Orientation towards Truncated Market 
Whereas the earlier industrial phase in Hong Kong saw most firms keen on making 
close contact with overseas buyers and local traders, the early 1980s also saw "atrend 
that makers nowadays prefer exporting direct to the buyers without going through 
trading companies" {Electronics Components 1982: 334). For example, Lai, who 
founded Fook Lung in 1982 after working in the electronics field for ten years, 
highlights securing buyers' orders as the most critical task during formation years: 
"When I set up the firm, there was difficulty securing orders. At that 
time, the rule is to do sales through a middleman [i.e. through local 
trading houses] and we follow suit. But we later realize that it won't 
work in long term and set up our own marketing three years later ... 
My experience in the field eases my contact with some buyers such 
that I can short-list them and call them accordingly. Since then we 
have shifted our focus from doing business through trading houses to 
direct sales to overseas buyers." 
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As long as the founder defines dealing with buyers as the most critical task in an 
organization, the sales and marketing function gains power over others. It is not only 
evidenced in small firms like Fook Lung in which the entrepreneur is preoccupied 
with the sales function, but also in relatively large groups. Of the 30 sales-led 
subcontractors listed in the previous section, 12 of them have more than half of the 
executive directors with sales and marketing background^ As for the other 18 cases, 
either the top management formation shows no clear inclination towards any of the 
three functions, or the company is basically managed by family members (see 
Appendix lB for details). 
An illustrative case is True Light, a Hong Kong-based company with 10,000-
strong total workforce in Guangdong Province of China. Even for this much larger 
firm which is organized in multidivisional form with much better integrated inter-
departmental communication, it is executives with solid background in dealing with 
overseas buyers that take charge in each of the four divisions. The explanation given 
by Pang, managing director, illustrates how the sales and marketing orientation 
prevails in the organization: 
"Business sense is the key asset in our group •.. To survive, we have to 
capture the market trend to foresee best-selling products in years to 
come. StafFs who keep close contact with our customers are in the best 
position to do this, and so we have all of our division-in-charge with 
such experience ... They set the direction for the groupjust like what a 
captain does for a ship". 
As a result ofthe dominance of sales orientation in strategic formulation, these 
firms lean towards business strategies that best suit the conception as well as the 
interest ofthe sales and marketing function, as for examples, market share expansion, 
product differentiation and market diversification. In fact, the overall inclination 
9 These 12 firms are AV Concept, Daiwa Associate, Golden Power, Great WaU, Hanny, K&P, Kinson, 
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towards sales and marketing strategies in the electronics field not only emerged in the 
earlier phase of industrialization when getting buyer's orders constituted the primary 
source of growth opportunities, but also lasted throughout the restructuring era when 
other business possibilities have become abundant. Three surveys lend us strong 
support. First of all, Lin and Tuan (1989) find that diversification ofproduction lines 
and product differentiation are the most popular strategies among local electronics 
firms, followed by diversification in overseas markets and developing new marketing 
channels. Secondly, Tuan and Ng (1995) discover that major business strategies of 
local electronics firms are "entering into new markets with existing products" (56%), 
"increasing market shares in existing markets" (44%), "developing new products for 
existing markets" (38%), and "developing new products for new markets" (31%). 
Finally, Federation ofHong Kong Industries, Industry and Research Division (1996) 
asks its members to list expansion plans in specific functional areas, and found that 
52.2o/o of the respondents picking marketing, followed by product design and 
innovation (35.8%), research and development (32.8%) and general administration 
(11.9%). 
The predominance of sales and marketing function in strategy formulation does 
not necessarily deter an industrial firm from industrial upgrading, but an orientation 
towards growth through getting more products sold in the OEM marketplace - a 
truncated market -- does. With most firms directing their sales and marketing effort to 
lure organizational buyers, it is no surprise that Dataquest Inc. (1995) blames the 
weakness ofHong Kong electronics industry in both brand management and direct 
distribution to end-users: 
"In general, manufacturers took a passive approach in the marketing of 
their products or services. About 30 percent ofthe companies interviewed 
Leading Spirit，Orient Power, RJP, Tomorrow and Welback. See Appendix lB for details. 
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mentioned that the marketing was mainly handled by their own overseas 
sales offices/agents. The other marketing means practiced by the 
manufacturers include advertising in trade magazines, participation in 
exhibitions, direct contact with customers, and customers' reference ... 
efforts spent in product market research and product marketing were 
minimal" (IV: 19-20). 
An orientation towards strengthening presence in a truncated market explains a 
subcontractor's lack of initiative in going beyond the OEM system. The leading role 
of sales staffs in these firms just pushes them closer to the subcontractor role by 
building the organizational competence around buyers' needs, as in the case ofTrue 
Light: 
"Our marketing staffs serve as the primary collector of market information 
because of their close contact with our customers ... Usually, a new product 
development project is led by staff involved in business. After they 
formulate an idea or concept, they turn the project to the R&D team for 
further development". 
Such a coordination routine - hiring R&D engineers to execute those projects 
assigned to them by sales and marketing staffs — blocks a subcontractor from 
capitalizing on business possibilities other than contract manufacturing. As long as 
such sales domination lasts, any attempt to go beyond the existing operation is 
unlikely because sales staffs who always eye on existing business opportunities in the 
OEM marketplace can never get a subcontractor out from its shell. Again, it is the 
case in True Light: 
"I don't think Hong Kong firms are able to do any invention, nor are we. 
What we can do is just to utilize proven technology for new product 
design, or we improve existing products with cosmetic design and add-on 
features". 
It is therefore no coincidence that True Light reports an upgrade trajectory within 
the systemic limit ofcontract manufacturing as many better-performing local firms do, 
transforming itselffrom a mere OEM supplier ofsimple consumer gadgets for mass 
merchandisers into an ODM partner with world-renowned brand holders for higher-
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priced products. While these competent players in the OEM marketplace demonstrate 
impressive product upgrade by a careful selection of quality-conscious buyers, they 
seldom crave out a market niche on their own by in-house development of proprietary 
products, not to mention brand management and technology catch-up. 
Structural Inertia in Sales-led Organizations 
While an orientation towards more sales in the OEM marketplace deprives a 
subcontractor firm of the motivation to go beyond the subcontractor role, 
organizational practices that are so designed as to excel in the subcontractor role make 
the firm ill-equipped for many other high value-added activities. To illustrate 
structural inertia of this type I provide evidence from a couple of cases that 
demonstrate how existing organizational practices constrain most upgrade moves, 
even if chief executives take strong initiative. 
While a sales-led coordination routine may streamline the operation ofan OEM 
supplier who aims to satisfy the needs of its customers, it inhibits in-house 
development of proprietary products. It is evidenced in the case of Innotech Ltd., a 
500-worker firm which found its organizational competence accumulated during the 
OEM phase through 1985 to 1993 inapplicable in an attempt to introduce in-house 
developed products in 1993. As Lee, the founder ofInnotech, discloses, what it takes 
to succeed in the OEM marketplace turns out to be so irrelevant to the business shift 
so that it had to build its R&D function from the ground up: 
‘‘We had to build our R&D team from scratch, starting with only a few 
engineers who each handle a project independently. Only after a few 
years we built up a hierarchical structure headed by a chief engineer who 
oversees all projects ... In due course our OEM customers offer us no 
help at all ... Actually, the operation is totally different from OEM 
business in that we launch our marketing only after we complete the 
product development". 
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Not only is an incapable R&D function evidenced in a small firm like Innotech 
Ltd., but a listed group like Faith International also had similar experience in its 
business shift. Even though the group has since being established in 1978 grown into 
a leading calculator manufacturer in Hong Kong, long-standing organizational 
practices were found useless in its attempt to catch up in technology. Indeed its shift 
to LCD manufacture by the early 90s might be impossible without an organizational 
restructuring, according to director Fong: 
“The calculator business requires no R&D at all, and we hire designers to 
carry out cosmetic designs suggested by marketing staff after 
communications with customers. But it is totally different for the LCD line. 
Our R&D management team in Hong Kong is fully in charge of 
development projects under supervision of top management. They are 
active in absorbing technology through various channels like overseas 
visits and direct communications with suppliers”. 
To add all up, sales-led coordination that facilitates fast success in the 
subcontractor role turns out to constrain both product development and technology 
catch-up. A shift away from the OEM role therefore requires a sales-led subcontractor 
to exercise organizational restructuring through major reallocation of resources. 
Unless power holders in the firm perceive a crisis in their business and take strong 
initiative, any systematic transformation away from their existing operation is not 
likely, as Fong explains in the case ofFaith International's move to LCD production: 
"OEM is a just dead-end road ... A turn to higher technology requires 
management to endure... we have to sacrifice short-term profit for long-
term growth. We are quite lucky to be backed by the calculator business, 
but the STN LCD line would need more time to benefit the group " 
Still’ the structural inertia is so strong that failure is not improbable. In fact, the 
same year Innotech Ltd. started R&D on proprietary products, the company 
experienced the most serious business downturn in its history. Likewise, Faith 
Intemationars continuous investment in LCD was only made possible by extracting 
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resources from the calculator line that remained for years a stable source of profit. 
With high risks involved in such a big move, it is no surprise that few sales-led 
subcontractors take an initiative to do so. In the final analysis the path-dependent 
development of sales-led subcontractors is as much because of their attachment to 
OEM as their inability to capitalize on other business opportunities. 
REEVSTATEVG LOCAL DYNAMICS IN GLOBAL CONTINUITY 
From now on we make more sense of the lack of industrial upgrading in Hong Kong 
electronics industry over decades. Whereas buyer-driven GCC recruited the vast 
majority of industrial entrepreneurs to the subcontractor role in the first place, 
structural inertia among these subcontractors helps maintain the status quo by making 
them reluctant to pull away from OEM business. But even ifwe may have shown how 
local dynamics play a part in stabilizing the global commodity chain, we have yet to 
figure out whether the insertion into buyer-driven GCCs paved the path-dependent 
development single-handedly. For this final question I seek to unearth in the next 
chapter alternative organizational forms with a view to show that Hong Kong's 
upgrade trajectory would have been different if the institutional context were not so 
structured as to foster the predominance of sale-led subcontractors. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REINSTATING POSSIBILITIES FOR UPGRADE 
If sales-led subcontractors are shy of going beyond labor-intensive OEM, it begs to 
ask why their predominance in the local electronics field has lasted for so long. Given 
abundant business opportunities in the restructuring era, Hong Kong could have 
significantly upgraded its industrial base by shifting to other global networks had 
there emerged alternative organizational forms. After all, these alternative forms have 
always been present, whose distinct business orientations pull them away from the 
vicious cycle of working in buyer-driven GCC, making them more likely to travel on 
a consistent upgrade trajectory by using alternative growth strategies. However, the 
proximate institutional context has always been less supportive, ifnot hostile, to these 
alternative organizational forms, depriving Hong Kong of a critical mass that could 
have made a difference in its upgrade performance in the restructuring era. 
ALTERNATWE ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS UNEARTHED 
The subcontractor orientation has been so prevalent in Hong Kong industrial field for 
so long that we are often tempted to take it as a Chinese her i tage?�But a cultural 
argument barely gives a complete account, as there still exists obvious differences 
between Hong Kong and Taiwan in entrepreneurial orientation (see, for example, 
Chen 1995 for a differentiation between the “production orientation" in Taiwan and 
the "market orientation" in Hong Kong). 
'° For example, Hamilton (1996) suggests the subcontractor mentahty be rooted in what he calls 
“Chinese capitalism," a version of capitalism grounded in kinship principles. On one hand, it nurtures 
the formation ofbusiness networks flexible enough to give Chinese capitalists a comparative advantage 
m demand-responsive settings. On the other hand, these principles have no affinity with businesses 
requiring high overhead or large factories. Hong Kong, a legenda^ center of Chinese capitalism, is 
organized around this orientation: "Hong Kong entrepreneurs let the market pulls products. Networks 
ofall firms hunted for and then responded to that market demand" ^[amilton 1997: p.21). 
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Table 4.1: Alternative Success Models in Hong Kong electronics industry 
Companies Major Outlets during Constituent of Success 
Formation Years 
Champion PTT in China Invention of the first Chinese-language pager and paging 
Technology system 
Chen Hsong Industrial Market in Hong Concentration on the design and manufacture ofplastic 
Kong injection molding machines of "Japanese quality at PRC 
cost" 
Group Sense Retail Market in Hong Invention of the first MPU-built electronic dictionaiy 
Kong unit, marketed under the "Instinct Dict" brand. 
Johnson Industrial Market in Hong Concentration on the design and manufacture o f m i c r o ~ 
Electric Kong motors through intensive research in engineering 
QPL Industrial Market in the Intensive investment in technology catch-up in lead-
Asia Pacific region frame manufacturing and IC assembly 
S.Megga OEM for AT&T of the US In-house development ofHong Kong's first cordless 
phones 
Varitronix Industrial Market in Hong Concentration on the LCD marketplace through intensive 
Kong research in technical know-how 
V-Tech Retail Market in US Relying on its specialization in MPU design to tum out 
brand-new products like educational toys and cordless 
phones, sold directly in retail markets under house brands 
Sources: Company JPO documents. Annual Reports, Newspaper Reports. 
][n contrast to the sales-led subcontractor model whose founders have been 
embedded in the subcontracting network, the alternative model has their founders 
detached from the market domain (Table 4.1 ； see Appendix 1C for more details). In fact, 
five of these eight firms have their founders being trained as engineers: Champion, 
Group Sense, QPL, S.Megga and V-Tech. As for the remainders, the founder ofChen 
Hsong was a mechanics, and the co-founders ofVaritronix were both Ph.D. in Physics. 
Whereas Johnson Electric was founded by a salesman in the late 1950s, the son ofthe 
founder - the company chairman at present - has joined the top management since 
getting a university degree in mechanical engineering in early 1970s. From the outset, 
these firms have detached from buyer-driven GCC by starting their business either as an 
inventor ofa proprietary product or an expert in a specific technology. For examples, 
before Champion Technology invented its Chinese-language paging system, Group 
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Sense applied the MPU technology to its electronic translator, and V-Tech launched the 
educational computer, there were no such products on the market. Likewise, while such 
items as micro motors (in the case ofJohnson Electric), liquid crystal display (Varitronix) 
and lead frames (QPL) are widely available, the three companies has been an expert in 
their respective fields. 
Ironically, while these eight firms could not benefit from the institutionalized 
subcontracting network in the local industrial field, their isolation from the buyer-
driven GCC also pulled them away from the vicious cycle of working in the truncated 
market. As a result, either do they take the driver seat to crave out a market niche of 
their own, or they take part in other global networks that are more supportive to 
industrial upgrading. For examples, Champion Technology, Group Sense and V-Tech 
each have established distribution channels for own-brand products. Likewise, Chen 
Hsong, Johnson Electric and Varitonix each have made use oftheir technical expertise 
to serve both local and global industrial markets, whereas QPL and S.Megga have 
each built a foothold in producer-driven GCC in which continuous upgrading is an 
imperative. 
As a result oftheir alternative connection to the global economy, they are better 
posited to travel on a consistent upgrade trajectory than the vast majority of Hong 
Kong electronics firms. Upon the precondition that isolation from the buyer-driven 
GCC opens up more upgrade opportunities, the outstanding upgrade performance of 
these eight firms points to the centrality ofbusiness orientations along with organizing 
strategies. Cases like V-tech and Varitronix show how a technology-based firm is 
built around the research orientation, whereas cases like Johnson Electric and Chen 
Chong show how a first-rate manufacturer is built upon the production orientation. 
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Technology-based Firms with Research Orientation 
Whereas the fast lane to success in buyer-driven GCC increases the likelihood of 
those who are embedded in the subcontractor network to start up an industrial firm, a 
minority of industrial entrepreneurs did come from the technology domain to found 
research-driven firms in Hong Kong. In line with their detachment from the buyer-
driven GCC, they are not to take successful dealing with overseas buyers as the most 
critical organizational task. Instead, they lean towards building an edge in specific 
technological areas by putting most organizational resources in the R&D function. As 
it turns out, their firms evolve around the research-driven model, which is set to carve 
out a niche in the global market through intensive R&D on proprietary technology. 
Active Assertion to the GlohalEconomy 
In contrast to sales-led subcontractors that are often started by experienced 
practitioners within the subcontracting network, research-driven firms are usually 
founded by those trained in the technology domain. With their detachment from 
buyer-driven GCC comes their assertion into a well-defined market niche in the 
global economy. Indeed Varitronix was founded in 1978 jointly by two former 
university lecturers in Physics with a view to tap into booming demand for LCD 
applications, whereas V-tech were founded by two electronic engineers in 1976 for 
the purpose ofmanufacturing first-generation home video games. As a result oftheir 
isolation from the subcontracting network, these research-driven firms had to build 
their own distribution channels early in their corporate history: V-Tech set up its first 
overseas sales office in US in 1982, and Varitronix established its first in US in 1983. 
That helped both firms to get rid of the vicious cycle ofworking in a truncated market, 
permitting them to accumulate reputation among end users oftheir products. 
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Organizational competence built around the research function 
But their emergence as one of the world's renowned technology-based firms has 
much less to do with a high autonomy in the distribution end than with a strong 
research orientation. In contrast to sales-led subcontractors whose growth hinges on 
selling more products through strengthening market presence, research-driven firms 
are characterized by a focus on the R&D function. After all，Varitronix excels on 
industrial market through in-house development of technological know-how on LCD 
production, whereas V-Tech builds an edge in consumer market by continuous 
product development on the basis of proprietary technology. 
The fact that the founders ofboth V-Tech and Varitronix remain integral to R&D 
activities illustrates the centrality of the research function in each firm, whereas the 
allocation of organizational resources in favor of the R&D function further 
distinguishes their organizational competence from that oftheir sales-led counterparts. 
As for examples, Varitronix devotes 7-8% of its annual turnover to R&D throughout 
its history, and R&D expenditure ofV-Tech amounted to US$24 million in fiscal year 
1996. As V-Tech's founder and CEO Allan Wong puts: 
“Our emphasis on R&D is the key to success. You can get short-term 
growth if you underbid your competitors with lower prices. Long-term 
success comes from providing as innovative and high-quality product at a 
reasonable price" (quoted in South ChinaMorning Post July 25, 1994). 
Not surprisingly, corporate growth of a research-driven firm often revolves 
around R&D expertise in a well-defined technology area. In fact, the design expertise 
on single-chip microprocessor has long constituted a core competitive edge for V-
Tech, permitting it to turn out proprietary products like computer educational toys and 
high-frequency cordless phones. Likewise, the top management of Varitronix calls 
itself"engineering boutique," referring to the capability ofofFering total solution for 
custom-designed LCD applications on the basis of technical know-how developed 
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in-house. In the words of the founder C.C. Chang: 
"We do not just acquire a technology and then mass produce it. We are 
rather like an engineering boutique: we devise technologies for whatever 
specific requirements you have" (quoted in South China Morning Post 
December 26, 1994). 
A powerful R&D function in organization 
Around this distinct business orientation a research-driven organizational form is built. 
In contrast to a sales-led subcontractor in which sales staffs often gain more power 
over other functional staffs, a research-driven model has an inter-departmental power 
structure more favorable to R&D personnel. It is evidenced in both V-Tech and 
Varitronix that an overwhelming majority of the top management comes from the 
technology domain. When V-Tech was listed on HKSE in 1992, four of the five 
executive directors were trained as engineers, whereas all six executive directors of 
Varitronix hold higher degrees in either science or engineering disciplines. With the 
top management remaining integral to R&D activities, the R&D function often gains 
a strong presence in the organization. In the case ofV-Tech whose R&D workforce 
now exceeds 700 people, its first offshore R&D center was established in North 
America as early as in 1987, followed by the second one in Guangdon Province of 
China in 1988 and the third one in the UK in 1991. 
But what ultimately distinguishes a research-driven firm from a sales-led 
subcontractor is rather the autonomous working ofits R&D function than the size of 
its R&D team (as a handful of sales-led subcontractors also have a sizable R&D team). 
According to Allan Wong, the working of its R&D function now forms a technical 
triangle {Hong Kong Economics Times June 19, 1996). Overseas research centers are 
for information collection as well as research in technology forefront, while 
headquarters in Hong Kong take up a co-ordination role, with the research center in 
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China responsible for turning technological know-how into production. 
We also find strong support from the case of Varitronix, whose R&D staffs may 
even be fewer than many sales-led subcontractors. A sales-led coordination routine 
just does not work for an orientation to build an edge in the technology race, as 
Varitronix's founder say in our interview: 
"The top management takes a vital role in co-ordination. R&D staffs 
seldom consider commercialization before taking up a research project, 
whereas sales staffs tend to focus either on promoting existing products or 
on conceptualizing new products without considering technical feasibility. 
That is why the final decision on the research direction goes to the board, 
which is consisted of directors with both technical expertise and 
commercial sense". 
From now on we better understand why research-driven firms often outperform 
their sales-led counterparts in spite of their marginality in the local industrial field. 
Established by founders with a growth orientation different from the prevalent 
subcontractor model, research-driven firms have from the outset set themselves apart 
from the majority by giving up the fast lane to success in the buyer-driven GCC. 
Instead, they strive to crave out a niche in the global market through continuous R&D 
effort in a specific technology. Not only does the building of a capable R&D team 
ranks among top priorities in various organizational tasks, but the co-ordination 
routines are also so designed as to facilitate its R&D function to accumulate expertise 
in a specific technology area. Thanks to their technological competence research-
driven firms are better posited than sales-led subcontractor to travel on a constant 
upgrade trajectory during the restructuring era. 
Forerunning Manufacturer with Production-Centered Orientation 
Not only can a sales-led subcontractor hardly accumulate technological competence 
because its R&D activities revolve around the need ofits buyers instead ofa specific 
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technology area, but its subcontractor role also implies its non-commitment to any 
specific product line. However, it is those who concentrate on a specialized product 
that stand a chance in becoming a first-rate manufacturer by virtue of their 
commitment to perfecting the production sphere. As in the case of research-driven 
firms，production-centered firms benefit from their detachment from the buyer-driven 
GCC. In line with their concentration on a specific product, the top-ranked 
organizational task goes to improvement in cost effectiveness through continuous 
process upgrade. As a result, they grow around an organizational form in which the 
production function takes the lead in corporate development. 
Concentration on specialized product 
In contrast to a sales-led subcontractor whose attachment to buyer-driven GCC 
inhibits product specialization, a production-centered manufacturer is characterized 
by its commitment to a single product. With practitioners ofthe subcontractor model 
unlikely to set up a single-product firm, the production-centered model recruited only 
a minority of industrial entrepreneurs whose commitment to the perfection of a 
product is often resulted from their past experience in the production domain. A vivid 
example in the Hong Kong's industrial field is Chen Hsong, whose founder is a 
mechanics that personally took part in designing the group's first-generation plastic 
molding machine in the late 50s. Throughout the past three decades, the group just 
concentrated on the manufacture of plastic molding machines on the basis of its 
corporate motto: "Japanese quality at PRC cost". 
Another case in point is Johnson Electric, whose specialization in micro motors 
for four decades has earned it a leader status in various applications like household 
appliances and automobiles. Whereas the rise of both groups amid burgeoning 
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demand from local industrialists set their early success apart from the majority whose 
prosperity came from more orders from overseas buyers, their single-product policy is 
made possible only by a relentless pursuit for efficiency over decades. After all, the 
production-centered model is so called because the production sphere is where the 
organizational competence originates. 
Organizational competence built around the production sphere 
In line with an orientation towards cost effectiveness, a production-centered firm 
directs much of its strategic investments towards the production sphere. While 
sales-led subcontractors may also invest heavily on production facilities, production-
centered manufacturers distinguished themselves by continuous upgrade in 
production facilities dedicated for a single product. In fact, Johnson Electric 
pioneered the use of purpose-built microprocessor-based manufacturing system in the 
local industrial field in the early 80s. As its IPO document gives an account: 
“To support its commitment to high quality at low cost, modern plant and 
machinery with a total cost of approximately $22 million was installed in 
the Company's factories during the year ended 3V' March 1984 and 
machinery and equipment costing approximate $50 million is expected to 
be installed in the current financial year... Much of the Company's 
automation equipment is specially designed and fabricated by its own 
manufacturing systems department which also undertakes research and 
development directed towards designing and improving the 
manufacturing processes and production techniques employed by the 
company" (p.ll). 
While one may wonder if industry-specific characteristics explain allocation of 
organizational resources like this, we are assured of the centrality of business 
orientation by the case of Chen Hsong, who went automation throughout the 1980s 
when other local manufacturers of molding machines chose production relocation. 
Just as a chief executive explains to me how a drive for manufacturing excellence 
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governs its growth trajectory during our interview: 
"We are the first in our field in Hong Kong to employ computerized lathes 
in the manufacturing process ... Indeed increasing automation has since 
the early 80s been our group's emphasis because of our inclination 
towards high-precision production. We never intend to lead the market in 
technology, but instead, cost and quality are always key to our leadership 
in the low-end to mid-range market". 
Functional integration in the production sphere 
Thanks to their first-rate manufacturing capability, both Johnson Electric and Chen 
Hsong have already built a strong foothold in their respective field. Underlying their 
manufacturing excellence is a functional integration centered on the efficiency 
orientation that ultimately sets their organizational development apart from the 
majority. Indeed the R&D function often works so closely with its production 
counterparts that research activity gears more towards the production sphere than the 
technology domain. The case of Johnson Electric illustrates how such production-
engineering integration works in the direction towards manufacturing excellence, as 
its IPO discloses: 
"The number of employees who were primarily engaged in research and 
development activities as at 3V' May, 1984, including those engaged in development of the Company's automation equipment and production 
processes was approximately 140, of whom approximately 100 were 
engineers and technicians, the remainder being craftsmen and tool makers. 
Such activities concentrate on the improvements in materials, development 
in machine tools, innovations in production methods, automation, and 
improvements in efficiency and performance ofthe micromotors" (p. 14). 
This certainly is not to say that the R&D function does not engage in 
development in new product or advanced technology. It does, just to show a greater 
concern on achievement of cost efficiency through engineering sophistication. Again, 
the IPO of Johnson Electric is illuminating: 
"Research concerning the efficiency and performance of micromotors is 
undertaken by an advanced engineering laboratory ... The product research 
and development department is also engaged in research concerning the 
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materials and components used in its micromotors ... The use of improved 
materials and computer-aided design equipment and techniques has made 
significant contributions to the cost, reliability and efficiency of Johnson 
micromotors" (p.l4). 
The centrality of the production function is also manifested in the marketing end. 
In contrast to a sales-led subcontractor in which sales staffs take the lead in the 
organization through their monopolization of market information, the marketing 
function of a production-centered manufacturer often involves its engineering staffs, 
who are themselves integrated with the production function. As a chief executive in 
Chen Hsong discusses the indispensable role of production and engineering staffs in 
marketing during interview; 
“The top management encourages us to collect feedback directly from end 
users of our machines through visiting their factories. The production and 
design departments take such an active role because sales staffs usually 
lack the background to process technical information." 
This is why a production-centered firm outpaces a sales-led subcontractor in 
accumulating manufacturing expertise despite their minority status in the local 
industrial field. Originated in an orientation to outperform other competitors in cost 
effectiveness, a production-centered manufacturer is so built as to achieve continuous 
process upgrade for a specialized product. As a result, they are set to travel on a 
development trajectory different from that of sales-led subcontractors, whose 
attachment to the buyer-driven GCC comes with an imperative to organize its 
production function flexibly enough for buyer's orders. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL EFFECT REEVSTATED 
The contrast among sales-led subcontractors, research-driven specialists and 
production-centered manufacturers by no means lead us tojudge which one is optimal. 
On the contrary, persistent diversity in business orientations in the electronics field 
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stops us from taking the subcontractor model as a rational choice or cultural heritage. 
Neither does the size argument work any better; the fact that all companies in the data 
set have grown from a relatively humble to a well-established scale in their course to 
public listing makes a perfect control of the size effect on strategic choice. However, 
the predominance of sales-led subcontractors in the data set does confirm my 
contention that the subcontractor model is more likely than its production-centered 
and research-driven counterparts to lead to corporate success in Hong Kong. 
But this situation is puzzling once we bear in mind the global restructuring in the 
1980s that should have provided research-driven and/or production-centered firms 
with ample business opportunities. To make sense of the persistent shortage of 
alternative organizational forms in Hong Kong industrial field, we had better take a 
closer look at the institutional environment on which industrial firms consistently 
draw resources for strategy formulation. While much have been said on the 
institutional configuration ofHong Kong's path-dependent development (Chiu et al. 
1997; see also Berger and Lester 1997), I turn to examine how proximate institutions 
help maintain the status quo by creating a resource differential in the organizational 
ecology. As we are about to see, even in Hong Kong where the industrial sector as a 
whole faces a less supportive environment, sales-led subcontractors are still more 
likely to become beneficiaries than their research-driven and production-centered 
counterparts whenever institutional support is available. 
Government support for industry 
Astonishing as it may sound, government policy sustains the status quo in the 
organizational ecology more because of its selective intervention into the industrial 
field than its adherence to the free-market doctrine. While the government has long 
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been renowned for refraining from designing an industrial policy to alter the pace, 
direction and pattern of industrial development, it nonetheless had an industrial policy 
of some kind. But unlike other Asian NIEs that follow a "top-down" approach to 
"pick winners，，，Hong Kong government uphold a "bottom-up" approach that 
concentrates on removing obstacles to industrial and commercial investment (Tsui-
Auch 1998). As a result, sales-led subcontractors - "winners" on the “free-market” -
-of ten become primary beneficiaries of industrial policy in Hong Kong, further 
depriving research-driven and production-centered firms of their chance in 
challenging the majority status. 
To look back, the government had often been responsive to the immediate needs 
ofthe majority in the manufacturing field. In the earlier phase, the predominance of 
trading-mediated manufacturing activities followed that "certification of origin, 
participation in trade fairs, and trade publications more or less exhausted what the 
colonial state did to selectively promote industrial growth" (Chiu et al. 1995: 115). 
Likewise, the vast success of export-oriented manufacturing through the 1970s to 
1980s paralleled a support system that evolved around the spheres of market 
promotion, trade facilitation and infrastructure provision (Sit and Wong 1989). With 
the late 1980s to 1990s witnessing massive relocation ofmanufacturing activities, its 
emphasis shifted to the facilitation of entrepot trade with China (Chiu et al. 1997). 
Not surprisingly, sales-led subcontractors benefited from their majority status in 
the industrial field to win public support. Indeed there is an affinity between the 
subcontractor model and the most prominent organization within the public support 
system - Trade Development Council (TDC), whose primary goal is to promote 
Hong Kong export trade. By contrast, alternative models find their needs low on the 
priority list of policy makers, a notable example being the lack of support for 
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product/technology research and engineering-related activities (Berger and Lester 
1997). Not until 1985 did the government grant $8 million to establish the Hong 
Kong Design Innovation Company Ltd. to provide the industry with product 
innovation and design services, and only after the early 1990s were a handful of 
funding schemes set up to support technology-related projects (Director of Audit 
1997). Calls for a science park and a NASDAQ-type second board even lasted for 
more than a decade before the government took them into serious consideration in the 
mid-90s. 
Al in all, local industrial policy helped sustain the status quo instead of 
stimulating systematic transformation in the industrial field. It is as much because of 
its failure in pushing the majority to re-orient their growth pattern as it lack of 
selective incentive for alternative organizational models to start up. Not surprisingly, 
the colonial government set up a high-profile Committee on Diversification in 1977 to 
address concerns about industrial upgrading, only to leave many ofthe issues signaled 
at that time unresolved today (Berger and Lester 1997). 
Capital market 
Believe it or not, Hong Kong's industrialists seldom find an easy assess to financial 
sources in local capital market, whatever banks, venture capitals or stock markets are 
in your mind (Berger and Lester 1997). On one hand, the "institutional separation of 
industry and finance" hindered upgrading strategies that require long-term, heavy 
capital investment (Chiu et al. 1997). On the other, the fact that trade credit has long 
been a major source of external finance in the manufacturing industry helped maintain 
the balance ofpower in the field. After all, sales-led subcontractors are more likely to 
benefit from the prevalent financial arrangement, as Bernard and Hallward-Driemeier 
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cogently put it (1997): 
"If start up firms do seek external finance, they usually approach 
banks and are extended trade credit. Such credit is short-term - 90 
days up to one year ~ and is secured by the receipts of the company ... 
The implications of this short-term loan structure varies across 
activities. For a trading concern with cash flow from the outsets of 
operations, rolling over this type of short-term loan may be feasible, 
due to the incoming revenues, and beneficial, as the firm can vary its 
debt obligations on short notice. On the other hand, a start-up firm, in 
software development for example, trying to turn an idea into a new 
product line typically experienced a lack of revenues at the outset 
which essentially cuts off trade credit as a source of financing" 
(P-299). 
That once again points to the advantages ofbeing the majority; banks are more 
befriended with those who concentrate on contract manufacturing for overseas buyers. 
Indeed such a financial arrangement just fits in the work flow of sales-led 
subcontractors: they obtain necessary cash flow to maintain their operation after 
getting a confirmed order, and theyjust keep the cycle running by getting new orders 
after old ones are shipped. In contrast, for those who neither start nor operate their 
business upon confirmed orders, a research-driven firm for example, banks are 
unlikely to be a source of capital. 
In a capital market where neither venture capital nor second board is available 
(Berger and Lester 1997; Chiu et al. 1997), start-up firms that intend to apply 
alternative business models in Hong Kong had better ensure quick return, or they risk 
running short of capital. Ironically, both research-driven and production-centered 
firms are far less likely than sales-led subcontractors to secure fast success in the 
institutionalized subcontracting network, which linked Hong Kong but to buyer-
dnven GCC That is why I point out the capital market as another institutional force 
that sustains the predominance of sales-led subcontractors in Hong Kong. 
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Education system 
With the government taking a prominent role in education, it is not surprising that the 
education system again created a resource differential in the industrial field. Just as its 
counterpart in industrial promotion, government policy in education and training 
consistently followed a "bottom-up" approach. The Advisory Committee on 
Diversification (1979) pinpoints the foundation on which the government formulated 
its policy on education and training during the 1970s: 
"[I]t was the Government's responsibility to provide education whilst 
restricting itself to facilitating training ... Industry must accept the full 
cost of providing this element of training, whether it be given in 
industrial premises or in training centres built and equipped for the 
purpose" (p.219-220). 
In other words, the education system is never designed to stimulate systematic 
transformation in the economy, not to say the industrial sector. While the Hong Kong 
Productivity Centre was a prominent public body for industrial training during the 
1970s, it just offered training courses mainly in the areas of production management 
and labor supervision in the earlier 1970s (Sit et al. 1979: 218). While the late 1970s 
saw the institution expanding its training courses in more specific fields like 
management and technology, just more than half ofits training activities benefited the 
manufacturing industry, the rest being absorbed by non-manufacturing sectors (ibid.: 
222). After all, the pledge to operate on a self-sustaining basis even pushed the 
institution to deviate from its aims and objectives, which is "to promote the increased 
productivity ofindustry in Hong Kong and to encourage the more efficient utilization 
of resources therein" (ibid : 227). 
Even though the government took up a more active role in industry-specific 
training by setting up the Vocation Training Council in 1982, its approach remained 
more or less unchanged, resulting in a technical training system far too passive for any 
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systematic transformation. Throughout the 1980s the industrial training system is by 
large responsive to the immediate needs of prevailing activities, “emphasizing the 
operative, craftsman and technician levels of skills" (Sit and Wong 1989: 67). The 
tertiary institutions where technologist training level is done did no better than 
providing general training for the business community as a whole. Indeed a common 
complaint among Hong Kong industrialists is that "the universities hold themselves 
alooffrom the industrial sector and do not tailor their teaching and research activities 
closely enough to its needs" (Berger and Lester 1997: 66). As a result, not only did the 
education system fail to supply personnel with a different perspective from the 
dominant business model, but it also results in a lack of collaborative research projects 
between universities and industries. 
Such an education system has quite different implications for different 
organizational forms. For sales-led subcontractors whose primary business objective 
is to secure buyers' orders for low-margin, large-volume items, it may be good 
enough to have a steady supply of operatives and technicians from vocational schools 
together with administrative and business executives from universities. The shortage 
ofexperts in industrial engineering and applied research does not hurt, nor does the 
lack ofcollaborative research between universities and industries. But it is a totally 
different story for research-driven and production-centered firms; they find 
themselves in an environment where the absence of a critical mass engaged in 
technology-related research activities hinders their core activities. To add all this up, 
the education system poses another institutional force in sustaining the status quo by 
depriving alternative models of the supply of appropriate personnel. 
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Labor market 
Ofless significance among all four proximate institutions may be the labor market, in 
which we see much more facilitating force on the subcontractor model than 
constraining one on alternative models. After all, there is still an affinity between the 
subcontractor model, whose primary manpower concern is numerical flexibility, and 
the local labor market, in which job mobility is normally high (Chiu et al. 1997). By 
contrast, such flexible labor market arrangement hinders the growth of both 
production-centered and research-driven firms by making firm-specific training 
difficult. 
The prevalence of sales-led subcontractors also benefit from a community-wide 
concern for low labor cost, with the industrial take-ofFgoing hand in hand with public 
subsidies in housing and medical service (Castells et al. 1990). The maintenance of 
low labor cost is such a legitimate concern that even when industrial competitiveness 
aroused wide concern in the 1980s, much attention revolved around importation of 
foreign labor (Tsui-Auch 1998). Not surprisingly, manufacturers who subsequently 
decided to relocate faced little resistance. While the weak union set them almost free 
from interference in devising that strategy (Chiu et al. 1997), the authority somehow 
regarded the relocation as optimal. Just as the Director-General ofIndustry (1993) put: 
“Hong Kong's proximity to China has rendered it possible to take advantage oflower 
land and labor costs in China. The shifting oflabor-intensive industries to China has 
resulted in a leaner industrial workforce here ... This has helped to lessen the cost of 
production, thus maintaining the competitiveness ofHong Kong products" (p.2). 
HONG KONG'S UPGRADE FA^URE RECONSmERED 
Not until we unearth the alternative model in the organizational ecology do we give a 
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complete account of the lack of industrial upgrading in Hong Kong electronics 
industry. By referring only to the prevalent business model we unfortunately obscure 
alternative organizing strategies that make up such world's renowned firms as 
Johnson Electric, V-Tech and Varitronix. More anomalous still, we produce no idea as 
to why these alternative organizational forms never become a role model and attract 
others to follow. In the final analysis, the Hong Kong electronics industry has been 
locked into labor-intensive OEM only because the institutional context has so long 
fostered the predominance of the subcontractor model in the organizational ecology, 
inhibiting the emergence of a critical mass that could otherwise help pull Hong Kong 
away from buyer-driven GCC. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOCIAL SELECTION OF UPGRADE TRAJECTORY 
This paper seeks to make sense of Hong Kong's underachievement in industrial 
upgrading over the past three decades. What we have gone through so far is 
somewhat contrary to the popular belief that Hong Kong is a free market where 
efficient allocation of resources at the economy level always go hand in hand with 
rational choice ofbusiness strategies at the firm level. With the business environment 
favoring those industrial entrepreneurs that are preoccupied with labor-intensive 
manufacturing for the international subcontracting network, resources in the 
industrial field are constantly allocated in a way that blocked Hong Kong from 
industrial upgrading. Of course, it could be counter argued that upgrade failure does 
not necessarily imply either irrational choice of growth strategies or inefficient 
allocation ofresources. But in this concluding chapter I will strengthen my case with 
the help of financial data of publicly listed electronics firms by showing how the 
subcontractor model undermines sustainable growth even at the firm level. My 
contention is that the social-organizational approach outperforms the free-market 
thesis by virtue of demonstrating a concrete linkage among the global business 
environment, the local institutional context and firm strategies. 
Beyond the Myth ofthe Free Market 
For many free-market advocates, Hong Kong's exceptionally low level of state 
intervention into the market sets it apart from the other Nffis in the region. Among 
them Young (1994) even praises the territory's outstanding record in the growth of 
total factor productivity (TFP) in the region, highlighting its economic growth as the 
result ofefficient use of resources — capital and labor - rather than continual pumping 
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offactors ofproduction into the economy. But as far as international competitiveness 
is concerned, efficient use of resources carries much lesser weight than such concepts 
as "competitive advantage, “ "entry barrier" and "rent protection". 
A case in point is the electronics industry in which capability to upgrade is vital 
for international competitiveness. Given Hong Kong's leader status in the region 
throughout the late 60s to mid-70s, its underachievement in industrial upgrading 
thereafter points to a situation that is hardly optimal. Despite its early lead, Hong 
Kong failed to keep up with the international race by moving towards high value-
added activities amid the restructuring era, in which Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan each upgraded their local industrial bases in one way or another. Meanwhile, 
the overwhelming majority of electronics firms declined to capitalize on upgrade 
opportunities opened up in the global economy, only to continue their cost-based 
competition in the OEM marketplace by production relocation in Mainland China. 
Even though product upgrade oflimited scale is recorded, neither process innovation 
nor technology catch-up has gone far enough to alter its status as a cost-based 
competitor in the international marketplace. As a result, the relative contribution of 
the industry to the local economy kept shrinking from the mid-80s onwards. 
Still, massive relocation did help hundreds ofHong Kong-based industrial firms 
to regain a foothold in the OEM marketplace. This is why one may suggest that these 
firms should have made the best choice for themselves by preferring production 
relocation to industrial upgrading. But as long as we hold that optimal strategies 
should achieve sustainable growth, their reluctance to complement relocation with 
other upgrade strategies justifies my doubt on whether the subcontractor model is 
optimal. By making use of publicly available data oflisted electronics firms in Hong 
Kong, we confirm that the dominant business model did no better than slowing the 
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downward spiral of Hong Kong's competitiveness in the international market." In 
Table 5.1 to 5.3,1 sum up the financial performances of the 53 listed electronics firms 
by grouping them in three groups in accordance with the classification scheme in 
previous chapters. Accordingly, there are 30 firms in the subcontractor model, 8 in 
the alternative model (i.e. those of research-driven or production-centered model), 
and 15 in the mixed model (i.e. those showing no clear strategic inclination). 
Table 5.1: Growth in Sales Turnover of Various Business Models in Hong Kong 
Electronics Industry, 1990-96 
Sum of Annual Sales Turnover of All Firms in the Group in HK$ Million 
Business No. of|~1990-9l|~1991-92!~~1992-93!~1993-94!~~1994-95|~1995-96!~~1996-97 
Model firms 
Subcontractor 19 10287 13631 17606 20293 25389 26516 2 7 ^ 
Model (32.5%) (29.2%) (15.3%) (25.1%) (4.4%) (52Va) 
Mixed Model 11 4985 5900 7497 8267 10064 l 2 ^ U ^ 
(18.4%) (27.1%) (lQ.3%) (21.7%) (19.8%) r5.0%) 
Alternative 8 6397 8657 10238 10890 13307 i I B 6 W m 
Model (35.30/0)1 (18.3%)| (6.4%)| (22.2%)| (13.9%)| (7.3%) 
Note: Figures in each bracket denote annual growth rate. 
Source: Shih (ed.) various years. 
The three groups show comparable growth in sales throughout a similar business 
cycle in the 1990s -- a boom in the early 90s followed by a relative slump in the 
mid-90s (Table 5.1). The subcontractor model even outgrew the other two in most 
years, probably because of a strong orientation towards more sales. However, the 
subcontractor model achieved that impressive growth only at the expense of 
profitability, falling far behind the other two models in both profit-to-sales and 
return-to-capital ratios (Table 5.2). In fact, the growth in sales parallels the 
considerable erosion in profit margin over the 1992-96 period, with the profit-to-sales 
ratio dropping below 3% and return-to-capital ratio standing at 1% in 1996. After all, 
the subcontractor model experienced a slump in net profit after reaching its peak in 
11 Their financial performances are compiled in a locally investment guide edited by Shih various years. 
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1994 (Table 5.3), confirming my contention that relocation but helps slow down the 
erosion ofHong Kong's competitive advantage over other cost-based competitors. 
In compared to the subcontractor model that competes for market share 
regardless of narrowing profit margin, both the alternative and mixed models show 
much healthier financial performance. The alternative model that complements 
production relocation with other upgrade strategies has both profit-to-sales and 
return-to-capital ratios topping double-digits over the 1990-97 period, and the mixed 
model that is less reliant on OEM orders also consistently outperformed the 
subcontractor model in both respects (Table 5.2). 
The subcontractor model's poor financial performance indeed corresponds to its 
vulnerable position within the buyer-driven GCC. In a comparison on profit stability 
over the 1990-97 period (Table 5.3), the subcontractor model shows the highest 
variation ratio (0.822), followed by the mixed model (0.553) and the alternative 
model (0.438). Such fluctuation in net profit makes sense, given its preoccupation 
with the international subcontracting network in which overseas buyers appropriate 
most economic rents. By contrast, the alternative model that is isolated from the 
buyer-driven GCC is assured of relatively stable business, and even the mixed model 
is less likely than the subcontractor model to be the loser in each economic downturn. 
Table 5.2: Profitability of Various Business Models in Hong Kong Electronics 
Industry,1990-96 
Profit to Sales (%) RetumtoCapital(o/o) 
Business No. of 1 ^ ~ ~ 1 ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ^ j ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ [ ^ ~ ~ 
Model firms 
Subcontractor 30 ^ ^ 1 ^ 1 ^ Ku foo 
Model 
MixedModel l5 U 3 5 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Alternative 8 24.93 16.63 17.56 1 ^ ^ U W 
Model 
Source: Shih (ed.) various years. 
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Table 5.3: Profit Stability of Various Business Models in Hong Kong Electronics 
Industry, 1990-96 
Sum of Annual Net Profits of All Firms in the Index of 
Group (Million HK$) Profit Stability 
Business No. of |Variatio 
Model Firms 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 Standev Mean n Ratio* 
Subcontractor l9 ~ ~ T O ^ 9 0 9 1256 1014 ^ -120 ^ 5 0 2 513.00 ^ ~ ~ 0 ^ 
Model 
Mixed Model U ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f u ^ ^ ~ " 2 0 8 1009 338.49 ^ ~ ~ 0 . 5 5 3 
Alternative 8 ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ 9 6 6 1114 1197 1294 1772 1312 521.40 ~ ~ T m ~~0.438 
Model 
*Note: The variation ratio, a relative measure of variation, is the standard deviation 
divided by the arithmetic mean. This serves to take into account the units of 
measurement and the location of distribution (Loether and McTavish 1974). 
Source: Shih (ed.), various years. 
Industrial Organizations as Social Organizations 
The above data show that the subcontractor model is hardly a set of optimal strategies 
in the restructuring era. On the one hand, the preference for relocation over upgrading 
helps the Hong Kong electronics industry only to delay the overall decline of 
international competitiveness amid the rise of other cost-based competitors. On the 
other hand, the preoccupation with OEM subcontracting undermines profit stability 
by putting them in the most vulnerable position across the global division oflabor. It 
is therefore no coincidence that many subcontractor firms report a slump in profit, or 
even a loss, in the mid-90s, when material and component costs soared as a result of 
appreciation of Japanese Yen, and competition in the OEM market kept intensifying 
amid the rise of ASEAN member countries. So lacking in bargaining chips against 
overseas buyers are these sales-led subcontractors that they had few choices but to 
give up profit margins for sales volume. Otherwise, they put their survival on risk 
because their organizations are not equipped for capitalizing on other business 
opportunities. By submitting to the subcontractor role year after year sales-led 
subcontractors indeed undermine their own sustainable growth. 
For those who embrace the rational-actor model, it has to be puzzling that the 
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majority of industrial entrepreneurs in Hong Kong adhere to the sales-led 
subcontractor model. But this paper seems to have found the missing piece by using 
the social-organizational approach instead. Rejecting the subcontractor model as a 
rational choice, this paper uncovers the dynamics of this business model by taking an 
industrial organization as a social organization. This is not to say that entrepreneurial 
choice is irrational, only to insist that rationality can only be "subjective" or "relative" 
in the sense that any rational choice is made with a frame of reference which is itself 
determined by the limitations of the rational man's knowledge. 
By going beyond the notion of economic man I do not turn to the notion of 
cultural man. Rather, this paper looks into the ecological evolution in Hong Kong 
electronics field with a view to find the root of this subcontractor orientation in a 
historically specific institutional environment. After all, the rise of sales-led 
subcontractors is contingent upon the pre-existing trading network that inserted the 
local industrial field into the global economy through buyer-driven GCC. With a fast 
lane to success in the subcontracting network, it required little technical or business 
know-how for a subcontracting firm to get more products/service sold by seeking 
more buying orders. Under this peculiar mode of industrialization, those who had 
already been embedded in the international subcontracting network even benefited 
more than technical and managerial experts did. As a result, the subcontractor model 
outgrew other alternative models in the field by attracting hundreds of imitative 
newcomers and/or spin-off firms. 
Whereas an insertion into the buyer-driven GCC recruited the overwhelming 
majority of local industrial entrepreneurs to the subcontractor role in the first place, 
structural inertia at the organizational level helps make these subcontractor firms 
stagnate in the OEM role. With the buyer-driven GCC not supportive to constant 
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upgrading on the part of local suppliers, local suppliers hardly have an incentive to 
upgrade their activities as long as they are preoccupied with the existing business 
arrangement. It is indeed the case in Hong Kong electronics field. The overwhelming 
majority of these sales-oriented entrepreneurs are so attached to the subcontracting 
network that they organize their firms around an organization form that is set to excel 
in the OEM role at the expense of other possible tasks. This path-dependent 
development helps explain why most local electronics firms failed to take the up-
market route in the restructuring era. After all, they are so preoccupied with the OEM 
role that production relocation turns out to be the only available restructuring strategy 
for them to stay competitive in the subcontracting network. 
Social Selection of Development Trajectory 
By linking local dynamics to global continuity, this paper also hints at the mobility 
chances of a locality within a stratified global economy. The case of Hong Kong 
electronics industry points to the priority of getting into the right network, i.e. one that 
is more supportive to constant upgrading. The better the network a locality has got 
into, the better the chance its industrial entrepreneurs stand in upgrading their 
activities. But the global force stops here, giving way for the historical-institutional 
context that ultimately determines into which global links a locality is to get. The 
growth experience ofHong Kong electronics industry: while the industry stood a slim 
chance in industrial upgrading because of its decade-long linkage to buyer-driven 
GCC - a global network that is not supportive to industrial upgrading, there is still 
much room for maneuver. Had the local institutional context stimulated the 
emergence of alternative models, the organizational ecology might have seen a 
critical mass that could have connected the field to other global networks, making a 
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difference in its upgrade trajectory during the restructuring era. 
To sum up, the path to industrial upgrading is more a result of social selection 
than market competition. Whereas legacy helps pick the industrializing agent in early 
industrialization, policy helps direct the development trajectory by approving the 
prevalence of a given business model. But at each turning point, each society still has 
a chance to make a difference in its positioning in the global economy by selecting 
another group of agents along with another business model. This is to say that the rise 
and fall ofthese competing business models depends upon the interplay between the 
global business environment and the local historical-institutional context. In the final 
analysis, there is no such thing as rational actors choosing optimal strategies in a free 
market, but only social actors doing the best with their tool-kits in a historically 
specific institutional environment. If this is what is always meant by market 
competition, I cannot agree more. If not, let us face the reality that we barely 
understand how the market works until we take it as a socially constituted process. 
END 
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Appendix 1: Data Set on the 53 Electronics Companies Listing on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
The major contention in this paper is that Hong Kong's peculiar upgrade trajectory 
in its electronics industry is a result of the persistent dominance of an organizational 
form in the industrial field. To look into the organizational ecology, I trace the 
growth trajectory of practically all publicly listed electronics firms in order to see 
which set ofbusiness strategies constitute its success, as defined by listing on HKSE. 
While the coding is subject to my judgment on qualitative data that include EPO 
(initial public offering) documents, annual reports, newspaper reports and/or articles 
in books and journals, the coding scheme is nonetheless systematic, as listed below. 
A. Coding Scheme of Key Variables 
Founder Background - coded by following the founder's work experience prior to 
starting the firm 
參 Market Domain — those with sales & marketing experience and/or those from a 
trading background; and those embedded in the buyer-driven, trader-mediated 
subcontracting network; 
• Technology Domain — those trained in engineering, science and/or other 
technological disciplines; 
參 Production Domain — those closely involved in the production process, e.g. 
industrial engineers, craftsmen and factory manager. 
Business Claim -- coded by seeing how the firm makes sense of its success, as 
expressed by Chairman/Managing Director in WO documents, annual reports and/or 
newspaper reports. 
• Research Claim — constant research and ceaseless innovation; 
• Selling Claim — getting more products and/or services sold; 
• Efficiency Claim — streamline the production for cost effectiveness. 
Business Orientation - coded by identifying the priority of business strategies at 
each company (usually evident during formation years, as well as under critical 
situations like planning for further expansion and finding solutions for business 
downturn) 
• Research-driven — product innovation; intensive R&D; in-house development on 
proprietary product and/or technology; 
參 Sales-oriented - market diversification; product shift; production expansion; 
product diversification; business diversification; brand building; expanding 
distribution channel; 
• Production-centered - vertical integration; automation; equipment/fix capital 
input; industrial engineering; material control; quality control; 
Top Management Formation — coded by looking into the composition of the board 
of executive directors 
• Sales-led — with sales & marketing staff over-represented in the board of 
directors as well as in the top management team 
參 Production - with production staff over-represented in the board of directors as 
well as in the top management team 
參 R&D-driven — with R&D staff over-represented in the board of directors as well 
as in the top management team 
• Others, such as family management or a balanced background. 
Competitive Performance - coded by seeing how the firm ends up doing by 1996. 
• Rear follower - concentrating on the lower end of the market by low-margin, 
large-volume production; 
• Competent OEM — serving world's leading OEM by distinguished 
manufacturing capability; 
• Niche Player — competing on a well-defined market niche not readily occupied 
by other competitors; 
• Segment^iche Leader — head-on competition with world's leaders in a specific 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2: In-depth Interviews with Hong Kong Electronics Firms 
This paper is set to uncover organizational dynamics, and so I conduct in-depth 
interviews with key executives of six electronics firms selected on a theory-driven 
basis. All Interviews are tape recorded, and then transcribed for further analysis. 
The Interviewees 
Company Post Held by the Why This Company 
Interviewee 
Fook Founder and Owner This firm is a typical small firm that 
Lung* has been a subcontractor throughout its 
development, never showing a move to 
get ride of the subcontracting network. 
True Light* Founder and Chairman This firm, one of the leading OEM in 
Hong Kong, shows how far the 
subcontractor model can go. Also it 
will shows what makes one OEM 
perform better than the others. 
Innotech* Founder This small firm showed a radical shift in 
business in recent years. A look into in 
it will show what makes a shift away 
from the subcontractor role possible. 
Faith* Executive Director This firm made an ambitious attempt to 
go up-market after its success in low-
margin, large-volume manufacturing. 
A look into it will show what it takes to 
succeed in such an upgrade move. 
Varitronix Chairman Provided exceptions prove the rule, a 
look into this atypical firm helps clarify 
what hinders the spreading of research-
driven firms. Besides, it certainly helps 
account for what makes a research-
driven firm different from the dominant 
model. 
Chen Section Manager Another atypical firm in Hong Kong. 
Hsong It is chosen due to the same reasoning as 
in the case ofVaritronix. 
Note: 1) Companies are arranged in order of appearance in the thesis. 
2) Those company names with an * are faked to assure our interviewees of 
anonymity. 
Some General Rules for Interview 
1. To gather data relevant to theory, the questionnaire is so designed that open-
ended questions dominate to facilitate follow-up ones. Though the interview 
may not follow a clear procedure, questions are categorized to ensure 
standardized coverage for each interview. 
2. With basic information on the interviewee before each interview, I seek to put 
emphasis on target categories according to the company particular. For 
example, if the company has a dominant buyer, the interview would probably be 
structured to explore their relationship. Likewise, interview with a company 
showing a tendency to vertically integrate will be evolved around this strategic 
choice. Therefore, various categories may contain overlapping questions. 
3. Generally speaking, historical approach would be preferred in each interview 
because more information about organizational evolution is obtained. 
The Questionnaire for a semi-structured interview 
Start-up mode 
Why you start up the company? What did you do before? What is the first 
product line you engaged? Why did you choose that? From whom your first 
order came? How did you get the paid-up capital? How long did your company 
begin to profit? 
What is the most important or successful step/decision you ever made that establish 
the success of the company? How is that made? Under what circumstances? 
What is the usual way of getting order now? How importance is the source? 
Evaluate the importance of OEM orders for your company, in terms of value and 
number of models. 
Product Design and Development 
What is the most successful products ever made by your company? Please detail 
how it is developed under what circumstances? How successful it was? What 
was its effect on the company growth? 
How often do you launch an in-house-designed product now? What is the 
procedure of the introduction of a new product? What is the most frequent change 
in a new product (cosmetic, features, etc.)? 
Who or which department would be the most frequent initiator of a new project? 
Do you have a software design dept.? 
Brand Development 
When did you develop your own brand? How? 
What is the ratio ofhouse brand and private label/OEM? 
Production and Process Upgrading 
Do you use CAD/CAM; CIM; or SMT, etc.? Why and when? Comment its effect on 
your competitiveness. 
What is your QC/QA system? Comment its effect on your competitiveness. 
Do you have ISO 9000 certificate? Why and when? Comment its effect on your 
competitiveness. 
Relocation 
What made you relocate? Did you consider any choices other than relocation? 
What is the benefit and loss of relocation? Any labour resistance during relocation? 
How is that resolved? 
What is the division oflabour between Hong Kong and China? 
What was the effect of relocation on your business development? Any advantages 
or disadvantages? 
Product line shift and diversification 
Is the current predominant product line the one five years ago or when start up? 
Why such a shift? Usually how often your shift the product line? 
How many product lines are you engaging? Why entering those line? 
Why did you enter unrelated product lines? 
Competitiveness 
On where does your competitive edge lies -- cost, market intelligence, flexibility etc.? 
Which element you consider the most important? Please detail why that is so. 
How would you comment on your relative competitiveness ~ e.g. on the rise over 
the past few years or vice versa? Why? 
What is your business plan in the near future? Who contributed to this strategic 
choice? 
Relative importance of functional departments 
Which functional department was first established in your companies - sales, 
marketing, production, QC, engineering, R&D? Please specify the current size of 
each dept. 
What is your own background and career path? 
Who is in-charge in the administration of the company now? What is his/her 
background? 
Discuss the present organizational structure ~ centralized control with functional 
departments vs. decentralized control with multi divisions? Who is in charge in the 
overall hierarchy? 
Interaction in organization 
Was there any crisis in your company during the years? What is the nature of the 
crisis -- production delay, capital shortage, market saturated, etc. How was that 
resolved? 
Discuss the decision-making process concerning the launch of a new product. How 
do you decide a new product to be launched? 
Concerning the major strategic choice, how is it usually reached? Who and which 
department would be the most probable contributor? 
Interactions with market, buyers and suppliers 
How do you get orders? How do you sell your goods ~ through own distribution 
channel, distributors^uyers, traders, etc.? 
Do you have a consistent dominant buyer? Over the years do you change your 
buyers? How would you describe your relationship with your buyers? Any 
technology or information gained from them? 
When you upgrade your products, do you need to find some new buyers/sales 
channels? 
How do you approach your market? How do you get market information to decide 
what product to launch next? 
How would you describe your relationship with your suppliers? Did you change 
your suppliers after relocation? 
On organizational Field 
How do you think your competitors come from? What is your competitive edge 
over them; do your strategies different from them? 
Which electronics manufacturer or manufacturer in general you consider the most 
successful in Hong Kong? Why? 
Does interaction among Hong Kong manufacturers intense? Do you think you have 
a different strategy from them? 
How would you describe your relationship with other industrialists in H.K.? How 
would you describe the mainstream of Hong Kong electronics industry? Do you 
think you are different? 
What is your opinion about HKFI, HKEA, etc. 
Organization-institution interaction 
Did you get any contact with governmental or semi-public bodies? Industry Dept., 
HKPC, TDC, HKITC, etc.? Which one you think is the most relevant to you? 
Please detail the project you participated or in what aspect these institutions hele 
you? 
What is your opinion about the universities and VTC; do they supply the people you 
need, if not, how do you train you own staff? 
What are the difficulties to do business in Hong Kong? Did the nature of these 
difficulties change over the years? What is the major source of your production 



















CUHK L i b r a r i e s 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 
00373TflS0 
